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Chapter 1: Housing Policy and Wealth Inequality
1.1 Introduction
As a necessity good, housing takes a large portion of the household portfolio
and consumption basket. On average, 18% of household consumption expenditure
is allocated to housing services in the U.S. (National Income and Product Account
1954–2016), and housing wealth is the largest asset in homeowners’ collective bal-
ance sheet. The recent Great Recession further demonstrates how disruptions in
the housing market can impact the U.S. economy. Despite its importance, not ev-
ery household can fully enjoy the benefits of housing, as many households live in
rental units.1 The homeownership rate in the U.S. exhibited a pronounced boom
and bust in the recent crisis, peaking at near 70%, but historically has stayed just
over 60% since the 1970s. This means that roughly 40% of households are renters,
either voluntarily or involuntarily. In fact, many households, mostly the young,
cannot afford a down payment on a house for various reasons, such as low labor
income, insufficient credit, or low liquid wealth, and remain as renters. This paper
is motivated by the observation that many of these involuntary renters may lag be-
1The property of housing as a consumption good and as investment asset is often referred to as
the dual role of housing. When mortgage financing is also counted as a benefit of housing, housing
is said to have a triple role.
1
hind in wealth accumulation, since the lost (or delayed) chance to own a home can
widen the wealth gap between homeowners and renters.2 In this Chapter, I explore
a simple economy where households can choose their housing tenure with no capital
returns from housing and illustrate how the housing market and wealth distribution
interact in steady state.
There is a long literature that studies various aspects of the housing market.
Some studies focus on the effect of housing price shocks on consumption and welfare
as in Campbell and Cocco [2007], while others conversely examine the source of
shocks causing the recent housing market boom and bust (Kaplan et al. 2015 among
others). However, there is little research studying how wealth inequality is affected
by the housing market.3 Since the dynamic role of housing markets in generating
wealth inequality has not yet been fully explored in the literature, specifying the
mechanism and quantifying its impact is worthwhile.
The central question I ask in the paper is how changes to current U.S. housing
policies would alter household access to homeownership and affect the wealth distri-
bution. To study this question quantitatively, I build a parsimonious three-period
overlapping generations model in which households face uninsurable idiosyncratic
earnings risk. Households have three tenure choices: They can be landlords, owner-
occupiers or renters. As landlords are the sole suppliers of rental units, changes in
housing tenure affect both housing and rental markets. Households consume and
save in risk-free financial assets (deposits) each period. Households can access home
2Kiyotaki et al. [2011] and Sommer et al. [2013] point out that the down payment requirement
is a hurdle to becoming a homeowner.
3Zhang [2015] is the only paper that explicitly studies this issue, but he explores the effect of
income inequality on house prices, not the impact of housing on wealth inequality as in this study.
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equity (mortgage) loans, at the cost of a down payment constraint which must be
satisfied whenever they adjust their mortgage debt or change housing stock. Young
households can benefit from inheritance and can leave bequests later in their lives,
but notably they cannot receive inheritances at the beginning of their economic lives:
i.e. all households start with zero financial assets.4 Specifically, I follow De Nardi
[2004] and De Nardi and Yang [2016] and assume “warm glow” bequests.
First, I employ the model to analyze potential effects of changes to down
payment requirements. By comparing each alternative steady state with a baseline
economy calibrated to long-run U.S. data moments, I find the following results.
First, changes to the down payment ratio affect the housing market. As the down
payment requirement varies from 0.4 to 0.1, the homeownership rate rises from
60.2% to 69.7% and the landlord rate increases from 6.9% to 7.3%. Second, the
down-payment requirement mildly affects the wealth distribution of the U.S. As the
down payment requirement varies from 0.4 to 0.1, the wealth Gini index decreases
from 0.697 to 0.685. Also, when compared with the average Gini index estimated
from Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), a fall in the down payment ratio from
0.2 to 0.1 makes the Gini index decrease from 0.687 to 0.685. To further understand
the changes in housing tenure choices, I explore counterfactual intermediate stages
that lie between the two steady state equilibria and analyze the general equilibrium
effects step by step.
Second, I study an alternative policy to allow a lower down payment ratio
4In my view, this is not a strong assumption in that most households inherit at middle-age,
and an aging population can be another factor that postpones bequests.
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only for owner-occupiers. By comparing two economies, one adopting this dual
down payment ratio policy (a down payment ratio of 0.2 for landlords and 0.1 for
owner-occupiers) and the other adopting a relaxed down payment policy for everyone
(a downpayment ratio of 0.1), I find out that the expected distortion in the rental
market is muted by a fall in rental demand. Also, the effects on housing tenure
and the wealth distribution are smaller when relaxed downpayment ratios are only
available to owner-occupiers.
Lastly, I study the effect of repealing the mortgage interest deduction. Chang-
ing the income tax code to repeal this deduction has been discussed for a long time
for reasons such as the need for adjusting excessive favors given to homeowners or
large losses in U.S. governement tax revenue. In my model, when the mortgage
interest deduction is repealed, housing demand drops with a fall in housing price.
The homeownership rate falls as more wealth is required for homeowners to support
the additional costs. Wealth inequality worsens as access to home ownership gets
more expensive. Thus, good intentions could lead to bad outcomes in this case.
In a nutshell, this paper shows that the effect of housing policy is not lim-
ited to the housing market, but rather extends to the wealth distribution. The
distributional impact of housing policy has been ignored in much previous work.
In this regard, I underline the idea that careful and thorough policy assessment,
including distributional impacts, in a general equilibrium framework, is important
when considering new policy, lest policy changes lead to disappointing or unexpected
outcomes.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 overviews the literature
4
to which this paper contributes. Section 1.3 outlines the overlapping generation
model, Section 1.4 defines the steady-state competitive equilibrium, and Section
1.5 discusses the calibration of the model. Section 1.6 discusses baseline quantita-
tive results, Section 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8 study each policy experiment and Section 1.9
concludes.
1.2 Previous Literature
This paper relates to two strands of literature. The first literature develops
models with uninsurable earnings risk, represented by Aiyagari [1994] and Huggett
[1996], who adapted the model to an overlapping generations environment. The
literature broadly studies topics of wealth inequality and tries to match the skewed
wealth distribution with additional model features besides earnings shocks.
Various underlying factors affecting wealth inequality have been studied in the
literature, including bequest motives and human capital (De Nardi 2004, De Nardi
and Yang 2016), heterogeneous preferences (Krusell and Smith 1998), and en-
trepreneurs (Cagetti 2006) among other factors. More potential factors, such as
health-related expenditure, increasingly have been added to the literature. This
paper adds to the literature by introducing the idea that heterogeneity in earnings
and bequests, which are already highly concentrated among the wealthiest few, can
be further amplified through housing markets to make wealth concentration in the
economy even higher.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on housing markets and their
5
role in the economy. The main objective of the paper differs from previous works,
which focus mainly on the effect of house prices on macro variables (Kiyotaki et al.
2011, Sommer et al. 2013, Favilukis et al. 2017), or on the sources of house price
booms and busts. This paper reverses the direction of research interest in that hous-
ing markets can work as a channel that affects wealth inequality. The paper is also
related to empirical findings on the effect of borrowing constraints on homeowner-
ship. Notably, Acolin et al. [2016] finds that wealth, income and credit are three
main constraints that limit access to mortgages, so that households with insufficient
wealth, income and/or credit are precluded from owning a house and making an
optimal tenure choice. Haurin et al. [1996] also supports the significance of home-
ownership in wealth accumulation, especially in the year before and the first year of
homeownership.
In terms of modeling the rental market, the literature exhibits two distinct
frameworks. Gervais [2002], Kiyotaki et al. [2011] and Yang [2009] assume a financial
intermediary that supplies rental properties. Alternatively Chambers et al. [2009a]
and Sommer et al. [2013] assume that households own rental properties and rent
to other households as an investment strategy. I follow the latter framework to
incorporate housing price and rental price variables explicitly in the model.5
5The literature belonging to the first framework assumes that the housing price is equal to the
price of consumption (Sommer et al. 2013).
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1.3 Model
I build a dynamic overlapping-generations general equilibrium model that fea-
tures a voluntary bequest motive and housing tenure choice. The basic structure of
the model is based on Aiyagari [1994] with the following features added. One is the
structure of the housing and rental markets, taken from Sommer et al. [2013] and
Chambers et al. [2009a], in which an agent can be a renter, an owner-occupier, or a
landlord who directly supplies rental units to other agents.6 This model feature is
different from the literature that assumes a financial intermediary which purchases
housing stock from the market and supplies to renters. The other is a bequest func-
tion taken from De Nardi [2004] and De Nardi and Yang [2016], who focus on the
role of bequest motives in wealth transfers across generations. In my model, agents
derive utility from non-durable consumption and rental (or housing) services, which
can be obtained either from renting or through ownership. Agents receive uninsur-
able earnings shocks and supply labor inelastically. They save in risk-free financial
assets (deposits) and can use their housing as mortgage collateral to borrow from a
financial intermediary.
1.3.1 Demographics
I assume an agent lives for three periods. At t = 1, the agent enters the econ-
omy with zero assets, and her productivity is inherited stochastically from parents
6Chambers et al. [2009a] supports the model structure by documenting that the majority of
U.S. rental property is owned by households.
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(human capital transfer). At the end of that period, the agent inherits her parents’
wealth. At period t = 2, the agent works with a new level of productivity due to
idiosyncratic shocks. At t = 3, the agent retires, receives a pension and leaves a
bequest to her sole child at the end of the period (see Figure 1.2). Population is
constant and thus each period the number of agents entering the economy is the
same as the number of deceased agents.
Figure 1.1: Description of Demographics
1.3.2 Labor Earnings Process
The total labor productivity for an agent i is the product of two mutually
exclusive processes: a deterministic age-efficiency profile εt and productivity shocks
zit: i.e. ez
i
t+εt . The age-efficiency profile εt, which is commonly applied to every
agent, follows Hansen [1993]. The idiosyncratic component zit, on the other hand,
follows an AR(1) process as zit = ρzzit−1 + µit, µit ∼ N(0, σ2z). In sum, labor earnings
for the agent i are yit = wez
i
t+εt , where w is the wage level. Similarly, children j
inherit their productivity level stochastically from their parent i in period t = 1,
8
when their parents are in period t = 3, i.e. zj1 = ρhzi2 + vj, vj ∼ N(0, σ2h).
1.3.3 Preferences
Utility from Consumption goods The agent consumes nondurable goods and
services c and housing services s, and achieves the following flow utility:
U(c, s) = (c
ηs1−η)1−γ
1− γ (1.1)
where η is the expenditure share of nondurable goods and services in total expen-
diture, and γ is the relative risk-aversion parameter.
Utility from Bequests I assume that the agent leaves voluntary bequests in
the last period (t = 3). The bequest utility function follows De Nardi [2004] and
De Nardi and Yang [2016], and is denoted by
φ(b) = φ1[(b+ φ2)1−γ − 1], (1.2)
where φ1 controls the strength of bequest motives by affecting the marginal utility
from bequests, and utility shifter φ2 governs the extent to which bequests are luxury
goods.7 Since the agent derives utility from bequests, she maintains a portion of her
wealth even later in her life.8
7If φ2 > 0, the marginal utility of small bequests is bounded, while the marginal utility of large
bequests declines more slowly than the marginal utility of consumption (De Nardi and Yang 2016).
This makes bequests a luxury good. I discuss these parameters more in Appendix A.2.
8This is how bequests can help match the high saving rates of old households.
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Tenure Choice Housing services can be obtained either via rental units at price
ρ or through home ownership at price q per unit of housing stock. I assume a linear
technology that allows transformation from housing stock into housing services one
to one following Sommer et al. [2013]. The household can be a landlord (h′ > s),
an owner-occupier(h′ = s > 0), or a renter (h′ = 0).9, 10
1.3.4 Assets and Market Arrangements
Assets and Home Equity Loans Agents can accumulate wealth using two as-
sets: housing stock (or residential assets, interchangeably: h′ ≥ 0) and deposits (or
financial assets, interchangeably: d′ ≥ 0) earning a constant risk-free interest rate
r. If agents own housing, they can borrow using long-term home equity loans (or
mortgage debt, interchangeably: m′ ≥ 0) with a constant interest rate rm. I assume
rm = r+ ι, where ι is a spread over the risk-free interest rate.11 At the beginning of
each period, agents have stocks of h, d, and m carried over from the previous period.
After earnings shocks are revealed, agents choose h′, d′, and m′. Note that agents
begin with zero financial assets and housing stock in the first period and cannot
hold mortgage debt at the end of the last period. Timing is different for the housing
9Note that in this paper, households get the same amount of utility per unit of housing regardless
of tenure. By contrast, [Kiyotaki et al., 2011] assumes lower utility from rental residences, and
[Sommer et al., 2013] assumes landlords lose some utility due to managing a rental property.
10In practice, a household can live in a rental unit while owning a house somewhere else. This
so-called ”owner-renter” is usually omitted from the analysis in the literature. I experimented with
allowing this type of household in my model, but found that households optimally choose not to
become ”owner-renters”. Therefore, I follow the literature and ignore this type of household in this
paper.
11Many models in the housing market literature assume a constant rate of return for financial
assets and a higher interest rate for mortgage debt (see Dı́az and Luengo-Prado 2008, Dı́az and
Luengo-Prado 2011, and Sommer et al. 2013 among others). Notably, [Chambers et al., 2009b]
assumes that the anticipated inflation rate equals the spread over the real interest rate. More
details will be discussed in the discussion of the financial intermediary.
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stock in that h′ denotes the stock used in the current period, and I assume that all
relevant costs and tax payments are related to homeownership, following Chambers
et al. [2009c], Sommer et al. [2013], and Sommer and Sullivan [2018]. Housing stock
is available in discrete sizes as h′ ∈ {0, h(1), ..., h(Q)} ≡ SH , where index Q is a
constant representing the maximum size of a house and SH a set of possible house
sizes. Renters can choose all house sizes in SH as well as an even smaller size unit
of shelter from a set of possible shelter sizes SS as s: s ∈ {s, h(1), ..., h(Q)}, where
0 < s < h(1).
Various Costs Households pay transaction costs when purchasing (κpqh′) or sell-
ing (κsqh) housing stock. The cost for selling is greater than the cost for purchasing,
i.e. κs > κp, which creates a non-convexity in the model. These costs represent op-
portunity costs such as the amount of time spent on market search, brokerage and
agent fees, moving costs, and so on (Yang 2009). Non-convex transaction costs
allow for lumpiness and inaction regions in housing choices, and reflect practical
considerations in purchasing or selling houses. Homeowners pay maintenance costs
at the depreciation rate of δh. The maintenance cost function can be described as
M(h′) = q · δhh′. Lastly, landlords in the model have to pay a fixed cost of ω, fol-
lowing Sommer and Sullivan [2018], which represents actual costs related to being
landlords.
Financial Intermediary A financial institution functions as an intermediary to
channel financial (or nonresidential) capital K from households to the firm at the
11
risk-free interest rate r. Financial capital can be transformed one to one from
deposits D, made by households through saving. The institution also makes home
equity loans M to agents at rate rm. The financial institution is risk-neutral, pools
all the financial assets and earns no profit in equilibrium.
I make two assumptions about transactions of financial assets. One is that
home equity loans, or mortgage loans, are subject to financial regulations, repre-
sented by a down payment ratio θ. In practice, home equity loans are determined
by an individual’s financial status, such as income (Debt-to-Income ratios) or the
total value of the house (Loan-to-Value ratios). A down payment requirement is not
sufficient to capture the variety of regulations in the U.S., but it is a good simplifying
assumption often made in the literature. The second assumption is that the loan
rate rm is a fixed spread ι over the risk-free interest rate r in the model (see Figure
1.2 for evidence on such spreads for the U.S. since 1977). If there is no friction in the
financial sector, the equilibrium level of mortgage interest rates should be equal to
the risk-free rate, since otherwise the financial institution will easily substitute from
lending to financial capital borrowers (firms) to home equity borrowers (agents) to
earn more. I thus interpret ι as transaction costs associated with mortgage lending,
which in turn equalize the marginal returns from lending in financial capital K and
home equity loans M .
Since the intermediary represents the supply side of nonresidential capital and
mortgage loans, and the demand side of deposits, its balance sheet (see Table 1.1)
is another description of the financial market. In the following, I use the term
“asset market” to refer to all three financial asset categories, and consequently the
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intermediary’s balance sheet being balanced will be used as an equilibrium condition.
I postpone the details to Section 5.12
Asset Liability
Mortgage Loans (M) Deposits (D)
Loans to Firms (K)
Table 1.1: Balance Sheet of Financial Intermediary
Figure 1.2: Mortgage Interest Rate and Treasury Yield
1.3.5 Final Good Firm and Technology
A representative firm produces final goods with constant returns to scale tech-
nology F (K,L) = KαL1−α, where K and L denote financial capital and labor
demand.13 The factor markets are competitive and thus capital and labor income
have constant shares. The final goods can be consumed and invested in physical
capital with depreciation rate δ.
12The financial sector follows Chambers et al. [2009a] and differs from the literature that assumes
that the financial intermediary buys housing stock and rents units in the market (Gervais 2002,
Dı́az and Luengo-Prado 2010, for example). Note that, however, in those papers, the price of
housing stock is the same as the price of consumption goods.
13I denote FK(K,L) and FL(K,L) as the marginal products of capital and labor.
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1.3.6 Government
Tax and Deductions The tax system consists of a general income tax at rate τ y,
an estate tax at rate τ b, and a property tax on houses at rate τh. Notably, there are
a variety of preferential tax deductions for homeowners, following Dı́az and Luengo-
Prado [2008]. First, the benchmark model assumes a full deduction for property
taxes on housing stock h′ from taxable income, denoting the value of this deduction
as τhqh′. Second, there is a deduction for mortgage debt interest payments from
taxable income, denoted as τmrmm, where τm is the deduction rate and rm the
mortgage interest rate. Lastly, the model has separate deductions for landlords,
whose taxable income includes rental income, but who can deduct a fraction of the
maintenance costs paid for rental units and the depreciated value of tenant-occupied
houses with deduction rate τ ll, as in the U.S. tax code. These deductions are major
incentives that favor homeownership in the U.S. The remaining taxes are all levied
proportionally, although the estate tax levies a rate of τ b on the agent’s bequests
net of an exemption level xb, which allows some portion of the bequest to remain
untaxed.
Social Security Social security benefits are modeled in a simple manner, to focus
on the housing market, and to avoid further aggravating the curse of dimensionality.
The government distributes a lump-sum pension tr each period to retired agents,
and funds the expenditure from income tax revenue. All remaining tax revenues are
used for government consumption expenditure G, which does not affect an individual
14
agent’s decision.
1.3.7 Dynamic Programming Problem
In this section, I specify the model economy with properties as discussed above.
First, I divide the life-cycle of agents (or households) into three periods. The young
and middle-aged generations work and earn labor income, and the old generation
consists of retired agents who receive social security benefits and leave some of their
assets to the next generation. The age difference between generations equals two
model periods, and thus agents in the model inherit bequests at the end of the first
period (just before transition to being the middle-aged generation). Consequently,
three value functions appear in the model: one for the young generation (Vw),
another for the middle generation (Vm), and the other for the retired agents (Vr).
1.3.7.1 Young Generation
A young agent starts in period t = 1 with no financial or housing assets. She
earns labor income, accumulates assets, purchases or rents housing, and can borrow
against her owned housing. The agent expects to receive bequests at the end of the
period, since their retired parents die with probability one. The young agents can
be represented by the following recursive dynamic problem. Sp is a collection of the
parent’s state variables, defined as Sp = (dp,mp, hp).14
14Note that state variables of the parents cannot be reduced to a single net wealth variable.
Two parents with the same wealth level but different composition of assets at the beginning of the
period make different choices because of income taxes, transaction costs, mortgage debt and so on.
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Vw(Sp, z) = max
c,s,d′,m′,h′
U(c, s) + βE[Vm(d′ + bn, m′, h′, z′)] (1.3)
subject to:
c+ ρ(s− h′) + Ih′ 6=0κpqh′ + Ih′ 6=0M(h′, s) + Ih′>sω
≤ y − d′ +m′ − qh′ −
[
τ yỹ + τhqh′
]
(1.4)
ỹ = y − τhqh′ + Ih′>s
[
ρ(h′ − s)− τ llq(h′ − s)− δhq(h′ − s)
]
(1.5)
M(h′) = δh · q · h′ (1.6)
m′I{(m
′>m)∪(h′ 6=h)} ≤ (1− θ)qh′ (1.7)
m′ ≥ 0 and d′ ≥ 0 (1.8)
h′ ≥ s if h′ > 0 (1.9)
bn = b(Sp) (1.10)
State Variables The state vector for the young generation consists of their re-
alized productivity level (z) and the parent’s state variables (Sp), which in turn
consist of the parent’s deposits (dp), mortgage debt (mp) and housing (hp). Agents’
productivity level is inherited from their parents (recall section 1.3.2). Since the
young enter the economy with no positive assets but may hold assets at the end of
the period, only parents’ asset variables appear in the value function for the young
generation. The prime superscript denotes next period variables: for example, mort-
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gage debt m is the choice from the previous period, and m′ is this period’s choice.
Note that state variables of parents affect the value function of the young because
they affect bequests made at the end of the period, and the net bequests are added
to the next period deposits (d′) of the children.
Expenditure The agent spends on nondurable goods and services c, saves in
risk-free deposits d′, and pays housing transaction costs. Transaction costs are at
rate κs when selling and at rate κp when purchasing.15 The indicator function I
throughout the paper equals one when the conditions in the superscript are satisfied:
for example, Ih′ 6=0 is one when agents are homeowners, Ih′>s is one when agents are
landlords, Ih′<h is one when agents sell housing, and Ih′>h is one when agents are
net purchasers of housing. Note that renters and homeowners who do not change
house size pay no transaction costs. Homeowners pay maintenance costs M(h′) that
vary with house value.
Incomes The working agent earns labor income y, and residential rental income
for landlords ρ(h′ − s).16 Government levies an income tax on labor income and
(for landlords) rental income, net of deductions allowed for homeowners, and as
specified in Section 1.3.6, additional deductions allowed for rental units owned by
landlords. The agent further pays housing property tax at rate τh. Young agents
inherit wealth net of bequest tax from their parents, but this does not appear in the
15It is evident that if m′ = m, and if the agent maintains the same housing stock, the agent only
makes the mortgage interest payment each period. Furthermore, when a homeowner purchases a
new house, she needs to pay both transaction costs.
16Recall that labor earnings y = wez+ε.
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agent’s first-period budget constraint since death occurs at the end of the period.
Notably, children inherit net bequests bn, which will be discussed when studying
the problem of the old generation in Section 1.3.7.3. Eq.(1.11) summarizes the
composition of taxable income for working agents.
Taxable Income
= Labor Income + Interest Earnings + ILandlord · Rental Income
− IOwner · (Mortgage Interest + Property Tax)
− ILandlord · (Rental Depreciation + Rental Maintenance) (1.11)
Housing Service The agent pays or receives rent at price ρ depending on housing
consumption s and housing stock h′. For example, if the agent is a renter, i.e. h′ = 0,
she pays the amount ρs to the landlord. On the other hand, a landlord agent, i.e.
h′ > s, does not pay for her own housing service consumption and further receives
rental payment ρ(h′−s) from the renter. If the agent becomes a homeowner or moves
to a bigger house, she needs to pay price q per unit of housing stock. This structure
differs from the strand of the literature that assumes that financial intermediaries
purchase the housing stock and provide housing rental services (Gervais 2002, Dı́az
and Luengo-Prado 2010, for example). A major drawback in those models is that one
cannot study movements of housing prices relative to consumption goods since this
price is fixed at one. Chambers et al. [2009a] provides the basis of the framework
used here, and they stress that the majority of U.S. rental property is owned by
households, which supports modeling the supply side of housing services as being
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provided by other agents.
Down payment Eq.(1.7) describes the down payment requirement. The require-
ment states that the agent must possess at least θqh′ of wealth to purchase a house.
There is no default in the model and thus the agent can maintain mortgage debt
unless the agent changes her housing stock, and thus one can treat mortgage debt
as a long maturity asset. As noted, the housing stock works as collateral to borrow
from the financial intermediary.17
1.3.7.2 Middle Generation
Agents at period t = 2 solve the following recursive problem
Vm(d,m, h, z) = max
c,s,d′,m′,h′
U(c, s) + βE[Vr(d′, m′, h′)] (1.12)
subject to:





+ Ih′ 6=0M(h′) + Ih′>sω
≤ y − [d′ − (1 + r) · d] + [m′ − (1 + rm)m] + q(h− h′)−
[
τ yỹ + τhqh′
]
(1.13)










and eq. (1.6) ∼ (1.9)
Note that from period t = 2, agents earn capital income from deposits rd
17Mortgage debt is the only source of borrowing in the model, i.e. renters cannot borrow.
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and pay back (or roll over) mortgage loans m borrowed in the previous period with
interest at rate rm.
1.3.7.3 Old Generation
Old agents retire and receive social security benefits, and leave bequests to
their children. They solve the following recursive problem:
Vr(d,m, h) = max
c,s,h′,d′
[U(c, s) + φ(b)] (1.15)
subject to:





+ Ih′ 6=0M(h′) + Ih′>sω
≤ tr − [d′ − (1 + r) · d]− (1 + rm)m+ q(h− h′)−
[
τ yỹ + τhqh′
]
(1.16)







ρ(h′ − s)− τ llq(h′ − s)− δhq(h′ − s)
]
(1.17)
φ(b) = φ1[(b+ φ2)1−γ − 1] (1.18)
b(d′, h′) = d′ + (1− κs)qh′ − τ b max(0, d′ + (1− κs)qh′ − xb), (1.19)
and eq. (1.6) ∼ (1.9).
Vr denotes the value function for retired agents. Agents’ state variables now
shrink to deposits (d), mortgage debt (m), and housing stock (h). They die at the
end of the period and leave bequests to their children. Equation (1.16) differs from
Equation (1.4) in that instead of labor income, the old agent receives social security
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benefits, denoted by tr. Note that agents in this last period are no longer allowed
to borrow, i.e. m′ = 0.
Bequests The agents derive utility from leaving bequests according to function
φ(b). Equation (1.19) indicates that the government levies estate taxes on the
portion of net bequests beyond the exemption level xb, where gross bequests are
defined as the wealth of parents at the end of the period, and net bequests subtract
housing selling expenses from gross bequests. The old generation anticipates their
death and chooses bequests optimally. Note that, all else equal, deposits d′ are more
desirable as a bequest than housing stock h′, since the latter incur selling costs.
1.4 Stationary Equilibrium
Definition of relevant variables To properly characterize a stationary equilib-
rium, let x be a state vector (z, d,m, h, Sp), S be the state space supporting x, and
BS be the Borel σ-field. Aggregate variables are denoted with capital letters, e.g. C
represents aggregate consumption, while IK and IH denote aggregate investment in
nonresidential capital and housing stock.18 Further note that H denotes aggregate
demand for housing stock, Hs denotes aggregate housing supply, which is fixed in
this paper, and PENS denotes aggregate pension expenditure.
Competitive Stationary Equilibrium A Competitive Stationary Equilibrium
is defined as a collection of value functions, prices, individual policy functions, ag-
18Aggregate investments are defined as follows: IK ≡ δK, IH ≡ δhqH. Note that aggregate
variables are constant at the steady state.
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gregate allocations, government policies, and a stationary distribution over x such
that
1. Given prices, government policies, and the distribution of x, the agent opti-
mally chooses c(x), s(x), h′(x), d′(x), and m′(x).19
2. A representative firm maximizes its profit:
r = ∂F (K, L)
∂K
− δ (1.20)
w = ∂F (K, L)
∂L
(1.21)
3. All markets clear:
(a) The financial asset market clears:20
D = M +K (1.22)
(b) The housing market clears:
H = Hs, (1.23)
19Agents are atomistic so that each individual does not consider other agents’ decisions explicitly.
20Formally, the deposit market, mortgage market, and capital market should all independently




d′(x) dλ, M =
∫
S
m′(x) dλ, andKs = K,
where D is demand for deposits by the financial firms, M is provision of mortgage loans by the
financial firms, and Ks is capital supply by the financial firms. However, the financial intermediary
is involved in all financial asset transactions, and the balance of the intermediary’s financial state-
ment can be described as an asset market equilibrium condition. This is because all the financial
assets are convertible one to one and they are treated like an single asset in the model (i.e. the
counterpart of deposits (supply of financial assets) is demand for mortgage loans and capital).
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(c) The rental market clears:
S = Hs (1.24)
(d) The government budget is balanced:21
G+ PENS = T (1.25)
(e) The goods market clears:
C + IK + IH +G+ Γ = Y (1.26)
where Γ denotes aggregate transaction costs.22
1.5 Quantitative Analysis
1.5.1 Solution Algorithm
The non-convex transaction costs in the model preclude me from using an Eu-
ler equation approximation that requires differentiability (Dı́az and Luengo-Prado
2008). Instead, I approximate value functions with discretized finite grids. Follow-
21Aggregate government tax revenue T is the sum of revenues from the income tax, (housing)
property tax and bequest tax, net of aggregate deductions: i.e.
T =τy
(









where LL represents landlords.
22Aggregate transaction costs Γ are the sum of housing transaction costs, fixed costs to landlords










ωdλ(x) + ιM , where Sell and Buy represent selling households and purchasing households.
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ing Dı́az and Luengo-Prado [2008] and Sommer et al. [2013], I lump deposits and
mortgages into a single measure of net financial wealth at = dt −mt.23 This reduc-
tion of one state variable alleviates the computational burden, leaving net financial
wealth, housing stock and productivity of the agent as state variables.24 I solve for
the optimal policy functions using backwards induction, compute the distribution of
the model economy across the discrete state space and iterate until the distribution
converges.25 The following is the specific algorithm I use to compute the stationary
equilibrium.
1. Make a ith guess of the market clearing price vector: housing price qi, rent
price ρi, and interest rate ri.
2. Search for price values such that excess demand of each market is close to zero.
I use three nested loops to find equilibrium price levels for houses, rentals and
financial assets.
(a) In each iteration, find the optimal policy functions that solve the cor-
responding Bellman equations specified in Section 1.3.7 by backwards
induction starting from t = 3 .
(b) With the policy functions from Step 2-(a), find the invariant distribution
over the state space.
23Agents do not hold deposits and mortgages simultaneously when there is a spread in the
interest rate between two assets (Dı́az and Luengo-Prado [2008] prove this in their Appendix A.).
24To be clear, parents’ three state variables are also state variables for young workers.
25I follow the literature and use a brute force discrete grid method. Since this method suffers
from the curse of dimensionality problem, I write the program in generic-C and introduce parallel
computing using OpenMP. I currently have 500 grid points for equity, 12 points for homeownership,
and 12 points for housing service consumption. In comparison, Sommer and Sullivan [2018] used
7 points for the house grid.
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3. With the policy functions and invariant distributions from Step 2, check if all
markets clear. If satisfied, a stationary equilibrium is found. If not, go to Step
1, update the guess and repeat the i+ 1th iteration process.26
1.5.2 Calibration
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Risk aversion γ 2.5 Selling cost κs 0.07
AR(1) coeff.(Inherit.) ρh 0.400 Purchasing cost κp 0.025
Innovation (Inherit.) σ2h 0.370 Down-payment ratio θ 0.2
AR(1) coeff. ρz 0.920 Depreciation rate (K) δ 0.1364
Innovation σ2z 0.380 Capital share α 0.3043(∗)
Mortgage spread ι 0.0124 Property tax rate τh 0.01
Maintenace Cost δh 0.015 Mortgage deduction τm 1.0
Age-Efficiency Unit εt see text Rental Depreciation rate τ ll 0.023
Note: (∗) author’s estimation using U.S. National Income and Product Accounts
and Fixed Asset Tables 1954∼2016 data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Table 1.2: Externally Calibrated Parameters
External Calibration I assume that population is constant and faces determin-
istic death at the end of the third period. One model period is 20 years and thus
one can think of the young generation as being from age 20 to age 39, the middle
generation as being from 40 to 59 and the old generation as being from age 60 to
age 79. Each generation comprises one third of the whole population. I set the
risk aversion coefficient γ = 2.5. I postpone discussion of the remaining preference
parameters to the internal calibration process.
I follow Gruber and Martin [2003] and set the transaction cost for selling a
house κs = 7%, and the transaction cost for purchasing house κp = 2.5%. I use the
26The government budget constraint is balanced with flexible government consumption expen-
diture and the goods market clears by Walras’ law.
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estimated value from Dı́az and Luengo-Prado [2010] and set the annual maintenance
cost parameter δh = 0.015.27 Next, in the benchmark model, I set the down-payment
ratio θ = 20% as is standard in the literature (Gervais 2002, for example). θ is a
key parameter in the paper and I use it to conduct a policy experiment in Section
6.
I use the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage interest rate as a proxy for the interest
rate on home equity loans, and proxy the risk free rate using the 30-year Treasury
constant maturity rate from the Federal Reserve Statistical Release. Data is avail-
able only from 1977, and both rates fluctuate over time, yet the spread between the
two rates has been relatively constant. Taking a conservative approach, I exclude
years that show extreme spreads, which were over 3% during the 2008 crisis, and
find an average spread of 1.24% over the period 1977 to 2017. One can see the
movement of these two rates in Figure 1.2.28
I use data from National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA henceforth) and
Fixed Assets Tables (FAT henceforth) from 1954 to 2016 to estimate the share of
capital α. The estimated value is 0.3043. The estimated value of the annual capital
depreciation rate δ using the same dataset is 3.64%, which is higher than the value
used in other literature. This is mainly due to the broad definition of nonresidential
capital: I include consumer durable goods, whose high depreciation rate causes the
average depreciation rate to go up. I discuss more details about my estimation, the
definition of variables, and relevant literature (e.g. Cooley and Prescott [1995] and
27Note that a model period is 20 years and thus all parameters are adjusted to annual values.
28Specifically, I use data from the Federal Reserve Statistical Release - H15 - Selected Interest
Rates.
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Gomme and Rupert [2007]), in Appendices A.5.1. and A.5.2. I set the property
tax rate as τh = 0.01 following the literature and leave the remaining tax rates
to internal calibration.29 Mortgage interest is fully deductible (τm = 1), and the
deduction rate for the value of rental structures τ ll = 0.023 following Sommer et
al. (2013), who estimated τ ll by multiplying the annual depreciation rate 3.63%
of rental structures by the composition of structures in rental units 64% (Davis
and Heathcote 2007). The social security benefit (pension) level tr is estimated by
using the U.S. gross pension replacement rate of 0.38 reported in the 2016 OECD
Pensions Statistics.30 Notably, pensions are not funded from a separate tax source,
but rather are funded by the general income tax in the model. I assume that social
security income of retired agents is taxable. As for the human capital transfer and
productivity shock processes, I modify the transition matrices provided by De Nardi
and Yang (2016), in which one model period spans 20 years, to fit into my model.
Internal Calibration The remaining nine parameters are calibrated internally.
Let Θ = {β, φ1, φ2, xb, τb, τy, ω, η,H} be the vector of structural parameters to be
calibrated. The vector Θ̂ is chosen by minimizing the sum of squared differences









29Saez and Zucman [2016] reports that the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data over 1989-
2013 on average shows an effective property tax rate of near 1% in the U.S.
30OECD publishes the gross pension replacement rate, which is defined as gross pension enti-
tlement divided by gross pre-retirement earnings. The figure is measured in percentage of pre-
retirement earnings by men.
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Parameter Value Moment Model Data
Discount Factor β 0.933 Capital / Output Ratio 1.666 1.672
Bequest Motive φ1 -0.055 Bequest / Wealth Ratio 1.25% 1.03%
Bequest Utility Shifter φ2 1.247 90th perc. of Bequest / Income 5.292 4.340
Exemption Level xb 9.627 Frac. of Estates paying taxes 1.0% 2.0%
Estate Tax Rate τb 0.307 Estate tax / Output Ratio 0.33% 0.33%
Income Tax Rate τ y 0.299 Gov. spending / Output Ratio 19.2% 19.1%
Consumption Share η 0.827 Housing / Non-Durable Cons. 0.254 0.256
Fixed Cost (Landlords) ω 0.005 Landlord / Homeowner Ratio 0.106 0.100
House Supply Hs 1.224 Homeownership Rate 66.1% 65.0%
Table 1.3: Internally Calibrated Parameters
The nine moments are chosen in consideration of their relevance to the ques-
tions addressed by the paper and the tight relationship between certain parameters
and certain moments for the given functional forms. The moments are taken from
various data and literature sources and their corresponding values are summarized
in Table 1.3. Note that the National Income and Product Accounts and Fixed
Assets Table from 1954 to 2016 are extensively used for several target moments.
For conciseness, I denote these sources as NIPA and FAT henceforth. First, I use
the nonresidential fixed assets to output ratio to discipline discount factor β. Non-
residential fixed assets and output are measured using NIPA and FAT data. The
bequest to wealth ratio and the 90th percentile of bequests divided by median in-
come are chosen to discipline φ1 and φ2 following De Nardi and Yang [2016]. Gale
and Scholz [1994] estimate the bequest to wealth ratio as 1.18%, including inter-
vivos transfers between generations. The 90th percentile of bequests is estimated
in Hurd and Smith [2001] using the Asset and Health Dynamics among the Oldest
Old (AHEAD) survey and Health and Retirement Study (HRS). Median household
income is estimated using the Current Population Survey (CPS) data for year 1994.
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The estate tax exemption level xb is calibrated to match the fraction of bequest-
leaving parents who pay taxes, and the estate tax rate τb is calibrated to match the
ratio of revenue from the estate tax to output (Gale and Slemrod 2001). The income
tax rate τ y is calibrated to match the ratio of government consumption expenditure
to output, which is measured from NIPA. The consumption share parameter η is
used to match the ratio of personal consumption expenditure on housing services to
consumption expenditure on nondurable goods and services, using the NIPA data.
Chambers et al. [2009a] compute the ratio of landlords to homeowners from Amer-
ican Housing Survey (AHS) data, using the fraction of homeowners who claim to
receive rental income. I use their value to discipline the parameter governing the
fixed cost to landlords ω. Lastly, the homeownership rate is targeted as 65%, which
is the standard long-term value used in the literature, and this value disciplines the
calibration of the fixed housing stock supply Hs.
1.5.2.1 Properties of the Calibrated Baseline Model
Moments The baseline model closely matches the eight model generated moments
to the corresponding data moments, as shown in Table 1.3. To further check the
properties of the baseline model, I compare several key statistics from the model
with non-targeted data moments in Table 1.4. First, I compare the fraction of
owner-occupiers with gross mortgage debt, which measures how likely agents are
to borrow. From 1994 to 1998, 65 percent of homeowners had gross mortgage
debt, according to American Housing Survey (AHS) data. The baseline economy
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exhibits fewer households in debt compared to the data. Second, the housing stock
to output ratio (qHs/Y ) is greater in the model than in the NIPA data, while
the equilibrium housing price to rent ratio is within the range reported by Garner
and Verbrugge [2009], who use data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE)
1982–2002. Lastly, the ratio of expenditure on housing services to labor income is
below the estimated value (0.25) in Davis and Ortalo-Magné [2011]. In a nutshell,
while the baseline model economy’s households store wealth heavily in housing stock
and depend less on mortgage debt than in the data, the model does not deviate
excessively from the reasonable range of U.S. data moments.
Note that the interest rate in the calibrated economy is 6.77%, which is close
to the level of the 30-year Treasury constant maturity annual rate 6.58% in the
beginning of 2000. A high interest rate in a model with a standard CRS technology is
not rare: for example, Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger [2011] assume an arbitrary
4% annual interest rate instead of the model implied annual interest rate of 13.75%.31
In contrast, many papers use a high interest rate rather than choosing a lower
interest rate in the calibrated equlibrium: e.g. Gervais [2002] (8.17%), Yang [2009]
(8.2%), Chambers et al. [2009a] (5.43%) and Kiyotaki et al. [2011] (6.69%). I follow
the literature and choose to calibrate my model to average data moments (e.g.
capital to output ratio) from NIPA, which imply a high interest rate.
Wealth Distribution I compare the model-implied wealth distribution to the
data. I compute the wealth Gini index (Table 1.5) and total wealth holdings of
31In a stationary equilibrium, CRS technology implies the following condition: KY =
α
r+δ
(Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger 2011).
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Moment Model Data
Share of Homeowners in Debt 0.29 0.65
House to Output ratio 1.828 1.203
House Price to Rent ratio 14.5 8∼15.5
Imputed Rent to Wage ratio 0.16 0.25
Annual Interest Rate 6.77% 6.58%
Table 1.4: Moments Not Targeted in the Estimation
top percentile households (Table 1.6), employing the Survey of Consumer Finances
dataset. I report all ten waves released by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, which show that wealth inequality has increased since 1989. I
compare the reported figures to model analogs in the bottom row where I include
only households with positive labor income and positive net worth in the data to
be consistent with the model. The model does not match the most recent data on
wealth inequality, yet its implications are within the historical range of the data.
This suggests that the model is a reasonable laboratory to study the effect of several
potential policy suggestions.32
Wave 89 92 95 98 01 04 07 10 13 16 Model
Gini 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.69
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Finances: wave 1989∼2016
Table 1.5: Wealth Gini Index
Further breakdown of the wealth distribution in the benchmark model shows
different levels of wealth inequality among landlords, owner-occupiers and renters.
As expected, wealth inequality, as measured by the wealth Gini index, is largest
32To understand the mismatch, I compare the wealth Gini index with a new model without
housing stock, i.e. similar to De Nardi and Yang [2016], and get 0.83. This reveals that the low
Gini index for housing stock is driving the Gini index to be lower in the model.
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Wave Percentile
60 40 20 10 5 1
Data
1989 97.28 88.33 69.11 51.27 36.96 15.79
1992 97.19 88.05 68.55 50.97 37.29 16.48
1995 97.26 88.13 68.55 51.13 37.67 18.66
1998 97.58 88.62 69.45 52.18 38.07 17.39
2001 97.71 89.86 72.2 55.13 41.42 20.06
2004 97.97 90.86 74.14 57.82 43.98 21.39
2007 98.02 90.81 74.33 58.07 44.34 20.65
2010 98.66 92.68 77.09 60.56 45.81 22.04
2013 98.71 92.89 77.76 62.03 48.27 24.30
2016 99.03 93.53 78.83 62.83 48.53 24.16
Model
98.98 88.93 68.04 51.09 38.36 19.67
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances: wave 1989∼2016
Table 1.6: Total Wealth held by Households in the Top Percentile (%)
among renters, followed by owner-occupiers and landlords. Below, I use these figures
as a benchmark to compare the impact of policy changes on the wealth distribution
for different groups.
Landlord Owner-occupier Renter
Wealth Gini Index 0.50 0.53 0.64
Note: This table shows the wealth Gini index of the baseline model
economy for different groups defined by housing tenure.
Table 1.7: Wealth Gini Index by Housing Tenure Choice
Asset Portfolios I now discuss the baseline model economy’s implications for
life-cycle patterns of asset accumulation and homeownership. First, Table 1.8 shows
that the distribution of end of period financial assets (in levels, left column) is
hump-shaped over the agent’s lifecycle, i.e. financial assets peak at middle-age and
remain positive yet smaller at old age due to bequest motives. Second, young agents
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use mortgage debt heavily, while middle-age agents carry little mortgage debt, in
part due to inheritances. Third, the middle-aged group holds the most housing,
while agents hold less housing stock in old age. However, housing wealth exhibits
smaller differences across generations than financial assets. Note that young agents
hold more in housing than in financial assets, while middle-aged agents hold more
financial assets than housing. This is consistent with the notion that young agents
take advantage of mortgage loans to purchase housing despite low earnings, and
then accumulate more financial assets as they age, with the help of inheritances
from their parents.
Young Middle Old
Deposit (A) 1.7 12.9 2.3
House (B) 9.0 11.5 7.5
Mortgage (C) 4.3 0.2 0.0
Wealth(A+B-C) 6.5 24.3 9.8
Table 1.8: End of Period Assets and Mortgage Debt by Age
Housing Distribution I split the support of the housing stock distribution into
three categories (small, medium and large), to show how each policy experiment
would change the distribution of housing owned.33 Note that in my model, the
level of housing stock owned does not necessarily represent the size of an individual
house, but rather represents total housing wealth that households own. For example,
owning 5 units of housing in the model could represent a single unit of size 5, or two
units of sizes 2 and 3. In short, we should not interpret the distribution of housing
33For computing the distribution of house ownership (h′), I set the first housing grid point in
the model as small, and housing grid points 2∼7, of which the maximum value is 4 times greater
than the value of the first grid point, as medium. I denote the remaining housing grid points as
large.
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ownership in this paper as the house size distribution. However, by analyzing the
distribution of housing ownership, we can see how our policy experiments change
the distribution of housing demand across homeowners.
In addition to the distribution of housing stock owned, my model allows me to
report the distribution of housing occupied, i.e. the distribution of housing services
s. Using data from the American Housing Survey (AHS) (U.S. Census Bureau,
2017), I can compute the shares of housing units occupied by size. I define small
homes as housing units of size below 1,000 square feet, medium homes as units
between 1,000 and 3,000 square feet, and large-size homes as units above 3,000
square feet. As the housing services grid in my model represents the value of housing
rather than house sizes, I match the model simulated shares of households to the
share in each housing bin from the AHS data and assign relevant grids.34 Table 1.9
shows the share of households occupying each size of house. Note that while the
distribution of owned housing enables us to see how policy experiments change asset
holdings, the distribution of housing occupied shows the changes in consumption of
housing.
Small Medium Large
AHS (2017) 23% 67% 10%
Model 37% 53% 10%
Note: Small homes occupied are those smaller than 1,000 ft2, medium homes
are those between 1,000 and 3,000 ft2, and large homes are those over 3,000 ft2
in the American Housing Survey (2017).
Table 1.9: Distribution of Occupied Housing (Service)
34For computing the distribution of housing services (s), small homes are the first housing grid
point, medium homes are the second, third and fourth housing grid points, and large homes are
the rest of the housing grid points.
34
1.6 Experiment 1: Alternative Down Payment Requirements
In this section, I use the calibrated model to study the effect of down payment
regulations. Households reallocate their resources in response to the changes in the
down payment requirement, represented by parameter θ. I vary the θ value from 0.1
to 0.4, in increments of 0.1, and report changes in asset allocations and the wealth
distribution in the model economy. Note that as this paper does not consider the
mortgage market explicitly, changes to down payment ratios do not directly affect
the mortgage interest rate. Only changes in the overall level of interest rates affect
the incentive to take on mortgage loans. Therefore, I assume that the mortgage
spread (ι) increases when the down payment ratio is lower than 20%. In practice,
lenders require Private Mortage Insurance (PMI) for mortgage loans in excess of
80% of underlying assets (i.e. the home value) to minimize risk. On average, PMI
premiums vary from 0.55% to 2.25% of the loan value.35 I assume that homeowners
who borrow more than 80% of home value must pay a 1.4 percentage point increase
in the mortgage spread. In a nutshell, this reduced-form adjustment to the model






Share House Price(A) Rent(B) A/B Int. Rate
0.40 60.2% 6.91% 2.24 0.153 14.69 6.7657%
0.30 61.2% 7.02% 2.27 0.156 14.57 6.7706%
0.20 66.1% 7.04% 2.31 0.159 14.51 6.7753%
0.10 69.7% 7.27% 2.37 0.164 14.44 6.7854%
Note: Parameter θ = 0.2 represents the baseline model economy.
Table 1.10: Effects of the Down Payment Requirement
1.6.1 Aggregate Effects
When the down payment requirement changes, marginal renters and small-size
homeowners are directly affected, since the mortgage debt constraint first binds for
those households that do not hold sufficient equity or households just above the re-
quired equity level to purchase housing. Households that are financially constrained
by the regulation cannot make their preferred optimal asset choices. Tables 1.10 and
1.11 report equilibrium statistics for each policy change. When the down payment
requirement becomes tighter, i.e. when θ is greater than the baseline value θ = 0.2
and more equity is required to purchase housing, one can witness the following: first,
as the limit of mortgage loans is shrinking, agents save more in deposits as renters
rather than purchasing housing stock (the deposit-to-housing stock ratio increases
from 59.8 % to 62.1%). Second, price variables move in the expected direction.
When the down payment regulation becomes tighter, fewer agents can own housing,
and the equilibrium housing price falls as a result of diminishing housing demand.
35Table 2 from Goodman [2017] reports the mortgage premiums of PMI, depending on FICO
scores. In this experiment, I choose the average number of 1.4%.
36The objective of this additional assumption is to examine how the economy responds differently
to the decline in the required θ from 0.2 to 0.1, if we consider mortgage interest rate adjustments
in the financial market.
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(a) Changes to House Size Distribution (b) Changes to Homeownership by Age
Note: Vertical axis of panel (a) is respective share of population. Figures in panel (b)
represent shares of sub-groups in total population.
Figure 1.3: Changes to Homeownership
Rent also falls due to overall decrease in demand for housing services. The interest
rate falls as agents pull their resources out of housing stock and instead save in de-
posits. Third, the homeownership rate falls (66.1% to 60.2%), especially among old
households (19% to 16%, as shown in the right panel of Figure 1.3). Lastly, increased
housing demand by the wealthy households taking advantage of lower housing prices
increases the number of households purchasing large size houses. Also, as house-
holds with less equity become renters, demand for small and medium size houses
fall (left panel, Figure 1.3). A policy change to the opposite side, i.e. θ falling from
0.2 to 0.1, has opposite effects, as I will discuss in detail in the next Section.
θ Deposit (A) Housing (B) A/B
0.4 0.0171 0.0275 62.1%
0.3 0.0170 0.0278 61.1%
0.2 0.0169 0.0283 59.8%
0.1 0.0167 0.0290 57.6%
Table 1.11: Effects of the Down Payment Requirement on Assets
37
1.6.2 Intermediate Stages
To better understand the effects of changes in the down payment requirement, I
set up intermediate stages between the two steady-state equilibria (one with θ = 0.2
and the other with θ = 0.1) for expository purposes.37 More specifically, I set θ = 0.1
as a new down payment requirement and explore two intermediate stages between
the two steady state equilibria: intermediate stage 1 (denoted as Price Fixed), in
which the down payment requirement has changed to its new level but all prices are
held constant; and intermediate stage 2 (denoted as Price Chg.), in which only house
prices change to their new equilibrium level.38 Note that each intermediate stage
is not in equilibrium. Yet, this is a useful method to understand the underlying
incentives and choices of households in response to policy changes. As an overview,
Table 1.12 summarizes the changes of prices, tenure choices, house distribution, and
asset composition for each intermediate stage up to the next steady-state equilibrium
under θ = 0.1.
1.6.2.1 Intermediate Stage 1: θ = 0.1 with Price fixed
When the down payment requirement is relaxed with no price changes (price
fixed), there is a noticeable increase in the number of small-size homeowners as
well as the total number of homeowners. Marginal renters now take advantage of
mortgage lending and become homeowners. As a result, the housing market is now
37Note that the movement in the interest rate in this scenario is so small that it has no noticeable
effect on the asset allocation and wealth distribution, and thus I omit that intermediate stage.
38After this stage, U.S. economy moves to a new steady state, where all prices change to their
new equilibrium levels under the down payment ratio of θ = 0.1.
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Baseline Price Fixed Price Chg. New Eqm.
Price House Price (q) 2.312 2.312 2.372 2.372
Rent (ρ) 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.164
q/ρ 14.5 14.5 14.9 14.4
Interest Rate (%) 6.78 6.78 6.78 6.79
Tenure Homeownership(%) 66.1 67.9 52.8 69.7
Landlord (%) 7.0 4.0 1.3 7.3
House Small 0.272 0.299 0.211 0.294
Medium 0.354 0.344 0.303 0.381
Large 0.036 0.036 0.015 0.023
Mortgage Household in Debt 0.193 0.201 0.087 0.215
(% of Homeowners) 29.2% 29.6% 16.5% 30.9%
Note: Original housing prices and rents are one hundredth of reported numbers.
Figures in ”House” row represent shares of population.
Table 1.12: Quantity and Price Effects of Relaxed Down Payment Requirements
Baseline (θ = 0.2) Price Fixed (θ = 0.1)
Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
Owner-occupier (A) 0.272 0.303 0.016 0.299 0.306 0.016
Landlord (B) - 0.051 0.020 - 0.038 0.020
Homeowner (A+B) 0.272 0.354 0.036 0.299 0.344 0.036
Note: Figures in the table represent shares of population.
Table 1.13: Changes in Housing Distribution: Price Fixed
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in excess demand, which tends to push house prices up.
1.6.2.2 Intermediate Stage 2: θ = 0.1 with Housing Price Change
The increase in the housing price (2.6%), while rent stays at the same level,
deters transitions from renters to homeowners, since households need more equity
even with the relaxed down payment. Table 1.14 shows that demand for each house
size decreases, especially for small size houses. The price effect is effectively driving
marginal homeowners to become renters and thus the number of renters at this stage
is greater than the number in the baseline economy. Also, an increased housing price
to rent ratio (from 14.5 to 14.9) reduces the incentives to become a landlord.
Price Fixed (θ = 0.1) Housing Price Chg (θ = 0.1)
Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
Owner-occupier (A) 0.299 0.306 0.016 0.211 0.292 0.012
Landlord (B) - 0.038 0.020 - 0.011 0.003
Homeowner (A+B) 0.299 0.344 0.036 0.211 0.303 0.015
Note: Figures in the table represent shares of population.
Table 1.14: Changes in Housing Distribution: Housing Price Change
1.6.2.3 New Steady State: θ = 0.1
The increased rental demand attributable to the rise in the housing price
causes rent to increase. This price change has an additional feedback effect: as the
relative price of housing gets cheaper (specifically, as the ratio of housing price to
rent falls from 14.9 to 14.4 in Table 1.15), agents utilize more mortgage loans and
purchase more housing stock (the fraction of indebted housedolds increases from
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Housing Price Chg (θ = 0.1) New Steady State (θ = 0.1)
Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
Owner-occupier (A) 0.211 0.292 0.012 0.294 0.315 0.016
Landlord (B) - 0.011 0.003 - 0.066 0.007
Homeowner (A+B) 0.211 0.303 0.015 0.294 0.381 0.023
Note: Figures in the table represent shares of population.
Table 1.15: Changes in House Distribution: a New Steady State
8.7% to 21.5% in Table 1.12). At the new equilibrium, more agents live in their own
housing, at the cost of an increased housing price. To comprehend the increase in
rent, we need to consider the distribution of housing service consumption s. Table
1.16 shows that the relaxed down payment requirement induces agents to live in
larger houses, mostly because of owner-occupiers. Lastly, as resources move from
saving in deposits to purchasing housing stock, the interest rate increases slightly.
Small Medium Large
θ = 0.2 Total 0.369 0.532 0.10Owner-occupier - 0.494 0.096
θ = 0.1 Total 0.349 0.552 0.10Owner-occupier - 0.527 0.097
Note: Small homes are housing occupied under 1,000 ft2, medium homes over
1,000 and under 3,000 ft2, and large homes are over 3,000 ft2 in the American
Housing Survey (2017).
Table 1.16: Housing Distribution Occupied (Service)
1.6.3 Distributional Effects
Table 1.17 shows that a relaxed down payment requirement alleviates wealth
inequality, while a tightened down payment requirement increases wealth inequality.
To get a sense of the magnitude of these differences, I compare them to differences
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over time observed in the U.S. data. From the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)
data in Table 1.5, the wealth Gini index has increased from 0.68 to 0.77 over the
past 27 years. This implies that the Wealth Gini index in the U.S. has increased by
0.003 per year on average during this period. Therefore, by that standard, a down
payment requirement change from θ = 0.2 to 0.1 would reverse roughly 2 percent of
the recent secular increase in the Gini index (Gini index falls by 0.0016).
θ
Percentile Wealth Gini Fin.Gini60 40 20 10 5 1
0.40 99.7 90.1 68.3 51.5 38.1 19.7 0.6972 0.8805
0.30 99.4 90.1 68.6 51.5 38.4 19.8 0.6964 0.8799
0.20 99.0 88.9 68.0 51.1 38.4 19.7 0.6867 0.8732
0.10 99.0 88.8 67.9 50.7 38.2 19.6 0.6851 0.8725
Note: Each figure represents a share of total wealth held by each percentile from the
top. θ = 0.20 represents the baseline model economy.
Table 1.17: Distributional Effect of the Down Payment Regulation
A further breakdown of the wealth distribution by housing tenure in Table 1.18
reveals that lower downpayments cause higher wealth inequality among landlords
and owner occupiers, but lower inquality among renters.
θ Landlord Owner-occupier Renter
0.4 0.337 0.517 0.649
0.3 0.403 0.522 0.648
0.2 0.496 0.532 0.644
0.1 0.577 0.546 0.644
Note: Parameter θ = 0.2 represents the baseline model economy.
Table 1.18: Wealth Gini Index (by Housing Tenure)
In a nutshell, the downpayment requirements affect wealth inequality, but the
magnitude of the changes is very small. Note that households can increase mortgage
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loans at low cost, as they do not worry about default risks in the model. In this
sense, incorporation of default in the model might generate more realistic outcomes,
which I leave for future research.
1.7 Experiment 2: Dual Down payment Ratios
In this section, I explore a novel policy of imposing different down payment
ratios, θ = 0.2 for landlords and θ = 0.1 for owner-occupiers, so that owner-occupiers
can borrow up to 10% more of housing value than landlords. The objective of this
experiment is to see what happens to the housing market, tenure choice and wealth
distribution if policy discriminates against landlords relative to owner-occupiers.
Landlords play a unique role in supplying rental units, and thus one can expect that
an unfavorable down payment ratio could disrupt the rental market.
1.7.1 Aggregate Effects
Comparing the fourth (θ = 0.2 & 0.1) and fifth columns (θ = 0.1) in Table
1.19, the differences from adopting two down payment ratios (”dual ratio policy”
hereafter) versus a commonly reduced down payment ratio (”common ratio policy”)
are the following: first, the homeownership rate under the dual ratio policy increases
relative to the benchmark with θ = 0.2, but not as much as under the common ratio
policy (from 66.1 % to 69.1%, compared with 69.7% in the common ratio policy),
because landlords cannot borrow as much as owner-occupiers. Second, the dual
ratio policy has little effect on price variables relative to the benchmark (θ = 0.2).
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θ = 0.2 θ = 0.2 & 0.1∗ θ = 0.1 (Common)
Price House Price (q) 2.312 2.325 2.372
Rent (ρ) 0.159 0.160 0.164
Price-Rent-Ratio 14.5 14.5 14.4
Interest Rate (%) 6.775 6.779 6.786
Tenure Homeownership(%) 66.1 69.1 69.7
Landlord (%) 7.0 6.6 7.3
House Small 0.272 0.301 0.294
Medium 0.354 0.357 0.381
Large 0.036 0.033 0.023
Portfolio Deposits (A) 0.0170 0.0169 0.0167
Mortgage Debts 0.0042 0.0046 0.0047
Housing Wealth (B) 0.0283 0.0285 0.0290
(%, A/B) 60.0% 59.5% 57.6%
Mortgage Household in Debt 0.193 0.210 0.215
(% of Homeowners) 29.6% 30.3% 30.9%
∗ Down payment ratio θ is 0.2 to landlords and 0.1 to owner-occupiers.
Table 1.19: Aggregate Effects of Relaxed Down Payment Requirements (Two θ)
The increase in the housing price under the dual ratio policy is smaller than the
increase under common ratio policy (0.6% vs. 2.6%). Notably, the rent increase is
near zero, contrary to our expectation, because the fall in rental supply is muted
by a fall in rental demand. Third, the increases in mortgage debt outstanding and
the number of households in debt are smaller than the increase under the common
ratio policy, reflecting a smaller increase in the homeowership rate and restricted
borrowing for landlords.
1.7.2 Distributional Effects
Table 1.20 shows that relaxing the down payment ratio only for owner-occupiers
has different effects on the wealth distribution relative to relaxing the ratio for all
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Wealth (Total) Deposit Landlord Owner-occupier Renter
θ = 0.2 0.687 0.873 0.496 0.532 0.644
θ = 0.2 & 0.1 0.686 0.873 0.478 0.545 0.644
θ = 0.1 0.685 0.872 0.577 0.546 0.644
Table 1.20: Wealth Gini Index for Various Down Payment Regulation
homeowners: first, the decline in wealth inequality is similar (from 0.687 to 0.686
vs. 0.685). Second, wealth inequality among landlords falls slightly rather than
increasing (from 0.496 to 0.478 vs. 0.577). The preferential down payment ratio
applied to owner-occupiers prevents some homeowners from becoming landlords. In
a nutshell, application of dual down payment ratios is less effective than a uniform
decline in the down payment ratio, if the policy objective is to affect the housing
market. However, if the aim is to boost homeownership with less distortion in the
rental market, dual down payment ratios could be a good solution.
1.8 Experiment 3: Repealing the Mortgage Interest Deduction
Homeowners enjoy preferential treatment in the U.S. tax system, to promote
the affordability of owner-occupied housing. The mortgage interest deduction has
been criticized as favoring homeowners versus renters who are relatively poor. In
the literature, potential problems arising from housing tax preferences have been
discussed starting in the 1970s (Aron 1970, Rosen 1979, for instance), and Glaeser
[2010] associates housing preferences in the U.S. with the housing bubble before
the global financial crisis in 2008. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) recommends avoiding tax policies that favor homeonwership
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as they can lead to excessive investment in housing (OECD 2011). However, oppo-
sition to revising the tax code is also strong. Defenders of tax preferences claim that
the administrative costs associated with estimating imputed rent would be immense
and that removing tax credits for homeowners would seriously reduce the wealth
of homeowners and consequently the whole U.S. economy. In this section, I use
my model to study the effect of removing the mortgage interest deduction on the
housing market and wealth distribution. The baseline model economy is the same
calibrated model as in Section 1.6.
1.8.1 Aggregate Effects
When mortgage interest is no longer deductible from taxable income, becoming
a homeowner requires more equity. Housing demand drops as expected, which causes
the housing price to fall, and households transition to becoming renters, which causes
rents to rise. From Table 1.21, we can find the following: first, reduced incentives
to borrow make homeowners depend less on mortgage debt (the share of households
in debt falls from 29.6% to 29.2%), and leads to a fall in mortgage debt (from
0.0042 to 0.0040). Second, the homeownership rate falls from 66.14% to 65.18%,
and households move their resources from housing wealth to deposits (the deposit
to housing wealth ratio increases from 60.2% to 62.6%).
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θ = 0.2 θ = 0.2, no MID∗
Price House Price (q) 2.312 2.236
Rent (ρ) 0.159 0.160
q/ρ 14.51 13.97
Interest Rate (%) 6.78 6.71
Tenure Homeownership(%) 66.14 65.18
Landlord (%) 7.04 5.50
House Small 0.272 0.268
Medium 0.354 0.352
Large 0.036 0.033
Portfolio Deposits (A) 0.0170 0.0171
Mortgage Debts 0.0042 0.0040
Housing Wealth (B) 0.0282 0.0274
(%, A/B) 60.2 62.6
Mortgage Household in Debt 0.19 0.18
(% of Homeowners) 29.6 28.2
∗ θ: Down Payment ratio, MID: Mortgage Interest Deduction
Table 1.21: Aggregate Effect of Repealing Mortgage Interest Deduction
1.8.2 Distributional Effects
If the rationale of repealing the mortgage interest deduction is to improve the
wealth distribution, the model result is to the contrary. As homeownership becomes
more costly with an increased housing price and no mortgage interest deduction,
more equity is required than before, and thus only wealthier households can now
become homeowners. On the other hand, from Table 1.22, we can see that wealth
inequality has decreased for deposits. Note also that the Gini indices for different
housing tenure groups suggest that inequality increases among homeowners (both
landlord and owner-occupier groups).
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Wealth (Total) Deposit Landlord Owner-occupier Renter
θ = 0.2 0.6867 0.873 0.496 0.532 0.644
θ = 0.2 with no MID 0.6871 0.872 0.510 0.536 0.644
Note: MID stands for mortgage interest deduction
Table 1.22: Distributional Effects (Repealing MID)
1.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I explore the impact of changes to the down payment ratio or
the mortgage interest deduction on the housing market and the wealth distribution
in the U.S., using a three-period lifecycle model. While the effect of down payment
regulations is strong for the housing market and mild for the wealth distribution,
the overall direction of changes are in line with our expectations. I further show
that a dual down payment ratio that favors owner-occupiers could cause less effects
on the rental markets at the cost of a smaller impact on the distributions of housing
tenure and the wealth distribution. On the other hand, repealing the mortgage in-
terest deduction reduces the incentives to become homeowners as the policy revision
requires more equity for homeowners. This limited access to homeownership leads
to an increase in wealth inequality. The analysis in this paper highlights potential
risks from housing policy changes, especially in terms of the wealth distribution. As
wealth inequality is becoming a major policy concern for the U.S. economy, as well
as most other advanced countries, a more careful analysis of policy impacts should
be advanced before actual enactment of housing policy revision.
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Chapter 2: Heavy property tax on multiple home owners:
How much does it decrease wealth inequality?
2.1 Introduction
Housing shortages and rising housing prices in major metropolitan areas are
major concerns in Korea. The Korean government has intervened heavily in housing
markets, using various tax and financial policies to discourage speculative housing
transactions and to stabilize the housing market. For example, the debt-to-income
ratio (DTI) and loan-to-value (LTV) ratio are frequently changed as prudential pol-
icy instruments to curb excessive housing investments by the wealthy and multiple
home owners. Notably, Korea has a unique real estate tax scheme to discriminate
among homeowners based on the number of housing units owned and the mar-
ket price of housing.1 The Korean government made an announcement on Dec.16,
2019 to increase the comprehensive real estate tax rate for single house owners by
0.1∼0.3% while further increasing the tax rate for owners of three or more houses
by 0.2∼0.8%.2,3
1Multiple home owners also suffer from unfavorable treatment in financing (lower LTV ratios
are applied) and other taxation (higher capital gains tax rates are applied).
2The comprehensive real estate tax is a local property tax on housing and land. I explain more
details in Section 2.2.
3In recent years, the Moon administration has set out a series of housing policies (18 times since
May 2017) with an objective to suppress demand from homeowners who own multiple homes by
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Low-income Middle-income Upper-income
2006 49.7 55.3 67.0
2018 47.2 60.1 75.2
Source: Korea Housing Survey (Annual), Ministry of Land, Infrastructure
and Transport
Table 2.1: Homeownership Rate by Income Level (%)
One rationale behind this heavy taxation on multiple home owners is that
it could decrease wealth inequality. Political discussion regarding the tax revision
has focused mostly on how much progressivity should be built into the tax system,
rather than on whether the tax system is actually a solution to the wealth inequality
issue. This is because housing in Korea is a lucrative asset, and is viewed as being
held mostly by wealthy, high-income earners (Table 2.1).4 Research on this topic is
rare, as no other OECD countries have a property tax scheme similar to Korea.
The question I ask in this paper is how much the Korean property tax scheme,
which imposes a heavy tax rate on housing owned by multiple home owners, de-
creases wealth inequality. As the complexity of the Korean tax system prevents me
from analyzing it in full detail, I build a stylized dynamic lifecycle model, which
is initially calibrated to the Korean economy with a uniform property tax rate
(τh = 0.13%). Then I undertake counterfactual experiments with dual property tax
rates: a lower tax rate imposed on households who own a small number of hous-
ing units and a higher tax rate imposed on households who own a large number of
imposing punitive taxation on multiple home owners in major regions across the nation. (Financial
Times ”Korea imposes tougher taxes on properties to curb price surge” (Sep. 13, 2018))
4As Ronald and Jin [2010] point out, Korean housing prices (particularly, apartment prices)
have increased faster than incomes and consumer prices (Figure 2.1 extends a graph reported in
their paper).
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Source: Korea Appraisal Board, National Statistics Office
Figure 2.1: Housing Price Index and Consumer Price Index (1986 = 100)
housing units. By comparing steady states, I numerically show the effects of the
discriminative property tax scheme on the housing market and wealth inequality.5
Households in my model work for four periods earning stochastic income, and
then retire and receive a pension for the remaining four periods. The model features
voluntary bequests as in De Nardi [2004] and housing tenure choices as in Sommer
et al. [2013] and Sommer and Sullivan [2018]. As the housing tenure choice in
my model allows me to separate owner-occupiers and landlords, changes in the
rental market can be explained through transitions in housing tenure.6 Note that
households supply the majority of rental units in Korea, supplying 78.9% of total
5Since the smallest housing grid point in my numerical solution cannot represent a single house,
I alternatively choose to experiment with a property tax scheme that separates small home owners
and large home owners. In addition, I refer to the Korean tax scheme as ”discriminative” in that
the tax system treats the same households differently according to the number of homes they own,
regardless of the homes’ aggregate market value.
6One feature of my model is that homeowners provide rental supply rather than financial
institution as in Gervais [2002].
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rental housing (Shin and Yi 2019).7
When the model economy introduces a higher property tax rate for owning a
large stock of housing, the asymmetry in tax rates induces households to purchase
less housing, leading to a decreased number of landlords and a fall in rental sup-
ply. Both housing prices and rents increase due to excess demand, but the overall
homeowership rate increases. Note that the first set of counterfactual tax schemes
are constructed to hold property tax revenue constant, i.e. the initial uniform tax
rate falls to a lower level to incorporate a second higher tax rate.8 Reallocation of
wealth from owners who hold a large housing stock to the rest of the households
makes wealth inequality fall. However, the distributional effects are very small rela-
tive to the change in the tax rates. For example, for the second set of alternative tax
rates (0.025%, 0.28%) (”Exp 1-2”), even though the higher tax rate is more than
double the initial tax rate, and ten times greater than the tax rate for small housing
stocks, the wealth Gini only falls from 0.6259 (”Benchmark”) to 0.6256.
I construct a second set of experiments to study the recent policy change
in Korea that increases property tax rates disproportionately, i.e. increasing the
tax rate for multiple home owners more than the tax rate for single home owners.
I experiment with three sets of tax rates: {(Exp 2-1), (Exp 2-2), (Exp 2-3)} =
7A special type of rental unit in Korea, so-called ”Chonsei”, is not considered in this paper.
”Chonsei” renters pay an upfront deposit to the landlords instead of periodic rents and receive it
back when the term is over. For the purpose of this paper, ”Chonsei” is only different in terms of
the timing of payment from standard housing rentals and both rents should be equal in equilibrium.
Moreover, the share of ”Chonsei” units in total rental units has fallen from 50% in 2006 to 36% in
2018, and the inclusion of another tenure choice would complicate the analysis.
8The baseline uniform property tax rate is 0.13%. Two sets of property tax rates
are considered in the first set of counterfactual experiments: {(Exp 1-1), (Exp 1-2)} =
{(0.1%, 0.17%), (0.025%, 0.28%)}.
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{(0.26%), (0.13%, 0.26%), (0.13%, 0.39%)}. As these revisions weakly increase tax
burdens of all homeowners, economies with the first tax scheme exhibits an increased
wealth Gini.9 However, when the last tax scheme is introduced, the wealth Gini
falls compared with the benchmark economy. This result supports the view that
punitive (property) taxation on multiple home owners can redistribute from wealthy
homeowners with multiple units to less wealthy small homeowners or renters (Table
2.15). Note that the distributional effect is also small in this experiment: the wealth
Gini falls from 0.6259 (”Benchmark”) to 0.6258 (”Exp 2-3”)
In a nutshell, this paper shows that imposing a heavy property tax on multi-
ple home owners does decrease wealth inequality. However, the distributional gains
come at the cost of wealthy households’ welfare losses: e.g. while average consump-
tion increases, consumption of households in the top 25% wealth percentile falls in
all experiments. Also, as my model does not incorporate heterogeneous asset re-
turns or productivities of households, if multiple home owners earn more than other
households investing in assets or businesses, the social opportunity costs of redis-
tribution could be high.10 Lastly, this paper studies the wealth distribution rather
than the aggregate wealth level. If the adverse effects of the policy on the total
wealth or productivity of the economy were considered, the evaluation of the prop-
erty tax scheme would be different. Therefore, I argue that one should be cautious
in using my results to defend the current Korean tax scheme.
9The effects on asset allocations and housing tenure are similar to the first experiment. Note
that the property tax scheme in this paper is proportional, which makes it regressive.
10From a purely theoretical view, heavy taxation on multiple home owners reduces their wealth
accumulation from asset returns of business income, and thus could decrease wealth inequality
further. This, of course, would also cost more to large home owners than my analysis would
indicate.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 overviews the housing
property tax scheme of Korea. Section 2.3 explains the model features used in this
paper. Section 2.4 outlines the overlapping generations model. Section 2.5 defines
the steady-state equilibrium. Section 2.6 discusses the calibration of the model.
Section 2.7 discusses properties of the benchmark economy. Section 2.8 conducts
experiments using the model and Section 2.9 concludes.
2.2 Overview of Housing Property Tax Scheme of Korea
Value of Housing General Multiple Home Owner
(S) ≤ 1.76 (M) ≤ 1.33 0.6% 0.8%
(S) 1.76 ∼ 2.24 (M) 1.33 ∼ 1.81 0.8% 1.2%
(S) 2.24 ∼ 3.19 (M) 1.81 ∼ 2.76 1.2% 1.6%
(S) 3.19 ∼ 9.22 (M) 2.76 ∼ 8.79 1.6% 2.0%
(S) 9.22 ∼ 16.21 (M) 8.79 ∼ 15.78 2.2% 3.0%
(S) 16.21 < (M) 15.78 < 3.0% 4.0%
Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance.
(S) Single home owner (M) Multiple home owner, all figures are in billion won
Multiple Home Owner: Owning more than three housing units, or two housing units
in speculative regions
Table 2.2: Comprehensive Real Estate Tax
Homeowners in Korea pay a property tax, levied by the national government,
and a comprehensive real estate tax, levied by regional governments. The com-
prehensive real estate tax was introduced in 2005 to increase the equity of the tax
burden on the possession of real estate, and to stabilize the price of real estate.11
The comprehensive real estate tax is only imposed on housing properties valued
above 600 million Korean won (500 thousand US dollars). Table 2.2 summarizes the
11This rationale comes from article 1 of the Comprehensive Real Estate Tax Act.
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tax rates, which vary with the value of housing and the number of housing units
owned. Single home owners can enjoy an additional deduction, which is another
type of tax discrimination against the number of housing units owned.
Source: Source: 2018 Statistics of House Ownership
Figure 2.2: Number of Housing Units Owned by Property Value Decile
The tax base of the housing property tax does not have a deduction based on
property value like the comprehensive real estate tax, but its tax rate differs from
0.1% to 0.4% depending on the value of the property. In summary, homeowners in
Korea pay the sum of the (standard) housing property tax and the comprehensive
real estate tax, and as multiple homeowners hold more expensive housing (Figure
2.2), they face higher tax rates on average.
2.3 Model
I use an eight period lifecycle model in which households face uninsurable
earnings risk and make ”warm glow” bequests and housing tenure choices. House-
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holds work for the first four periods earning labor income, and then receive pensions
for the next four periods.12 The bequest utility function follows De Nardi [2004],
and total bequests are assumed to be fully taxed and redistributed to the working
households.13
2.3.1 Households
Income Households earn stochastic incomes which are uninsurable following Aiya-
gari [1994]. The labor productivity ezit+εt consists of deterministic age-efficiency
profiles εt and productivity shocks zit.14 The productivity shocks follow an AR(1)
process as zit = ρzzit−1 + µit, where µit ∼ N(0, σ2z).
Preferences Households consume nondurable good c and housing services s. I
assume that the consumption weight on each good is fixed as η and that risk-
aversion parameters (γ1 and γ2) are not identical following Chambers et al. [2009b]
and Cho [2012]. Households enjoy higher utility from owned housing than from
rental housing, which is reflected in the model with parameter ψ.15
u(c, s) = η · c
γ1
1− γ1




12We can think of a model period as lasting 10 years, so that households enter the economy at
age 20 (model period t = 1), retire at age 60 (t = 5) and die at the end of age 89 (model period
t = 8). I assume no death risk in the model, so that households die at the end of period t = 8 with
probability one.
13In other words, I do not assume direct intergenerational links between parents and children.
14Note that t represents model periods and i represents households throughout the paper.
15ψ takes a value between zero and one. The housing literature often uses this preference
specification, e.g. Kiyotaki et al. [2011]. In contrast, alternative models with preferential tax
deductions for homeowners could generate enough homeowners in the model even without this
assumption (Sommer et al. 2013, Chambers et al. 2009a).
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Housing Tenure Housing tenure options in my model follow Sommer et al. [2013]:
households can stay in rental housing (”Renter”), live in their own housing (”Owner-
occupier”) or rent part of their housing (”Landlord”). Renters consume housing
services s at rent ps. Owner-occupiers hold housing stock (h′ > 0) at housing price
ph and live in the same units (h′ = s). There is a linear technology that transforms
housing stock h′ to housing services s one to one. Landlords hold housing stock
(h′ > s) and supply excess rental units (h′ − s) to the renters. Only homeowners
can borrow (m′ > 0) against their housing, and pay mortgage interest next period.
All homeowners pay maintenance costs of δhphh′ and proportional transaction
costs are incurred at rate κs when households sell their housing stock and at rate
κp when households purchase housing stock. I assume selling costs are greater
than purchasing costs (κs > κp). Landlords pay an additional fixed cost ω which
represents the managerial cost associated with rental units in practice.
Assets and Mortgage Debt Households can either save in deposits (d′) and
earn interest income at a risk free rate r, or purchase housing stock (h′) with mort-
gage borrowing at a constant rate rm. Note that mortage debt (m′) is limited by
down-payment requirement ratio θ as m′ ≤ (1 − θ)phh′. Both housing stock and
housing services are available in discrete sizes: h′ ∈ {0, h(1), ..., h(Q)} ≡ SH and
s ∈ {s, s(1), ..., s(Q)}, where Q represents an index for maximum housing size, SH is
a set of possible house sizes and s is the smallest level of housing services available.
Note that renters can live in smaller housing units, i.e. s < h(1), following Sommer
et al. [2013].
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Bequest At the end of the last period (t = 8), households leave bequests q and
benefit according to a warm-glow bequest utility function as in De Nardi [2004]:




where q ≡ d′ + (1− κs)qh′.
I make two assumptions about bequests: first, bequests are equal to a house-
hold’s end-of-life net wealth after paying selling costs. Second, all bequests are fully
taxed and equally redistributed to working households as in Cho [2010].16
2.3.2 Firm
A representative firm produces a nondurable good using labor L and capital
K with a standard Cobb-Douglas production function: F (K,L) = KαL1−α. Factor
markets are competitive and capital depreciates at the rate δ. Produced goods can
be transformed to capital one to one.
2.3.3 Government
The government levies an income tax at rate τ y on incomes of households,
a property tax with rate τh on the housing stock of homeowners and a bequest
tax on bequests of the deceased. Tax revenues are used to distribute a lump-sum
pension b and a transfer T to working households. Remaining revenues are spent
16This simple bequest function creates enough wealth held by old households to create a plausible
wealth distribution without having complex intergenerational links between parents and children
(refer to De Nardi and Yang 2016).
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for government expenditure G. Note that homeowners in Korea do not benefit from
income tax deductions for mortgage interest or property tax payments. However,
landlords can deduct rental income from taxable income at the deduction rate τ ll.17
2.3.4 Financial Intermediary
A financial intermediary channels all financial flows in the market, which in-
clude deposits d′, capital K and mortgage debt m′. The financial intermediary is
involved in all financial asset transactions: it receives deposits from households and
supplies mortgage loans to homeowners and capital to firms. The financial insti-
tution is risk-neutral and earns no profit from intermediation. I assume that the
mortgage interest rate rm is a fixed spread ι over the risk-free interest rate r and
that intermediation of mortgage loans incurs a transaction cost to the financial in-
termediary at the rate (or price) ι. In this way, the equilibrium conditions for loans
and deposits are reduced to the equilibrium condition of the intermediary’s balance
sheet.18
17Article 75 of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act stipulates a rental income deduction rate
from 20% to 75% depending on the number and size of rental housing units owned.
18Formally, the deposit market, mortgage market, and capital market should all independently




d′(x) dλ, M =
∫
S
m′(x) dλ, andKs = K,
where D is demand for deposits by the financial firms, M is provision of mortgage loan by the
financial firms, and Ks is capital supply by the financial firms. As the financial intermediary
is the sole channel of the three financial instruments, the balance of the intermediary’s financial
statement can be described as an asset market equilibrium condition as in Chambers et al. [2009a].
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Asset Liability
Mortgage Loans (M) Deposits (D)
Loans to Firms (K)
Table 2.3: Balance Sheet of the Financial Intermediary
2.4 Dynamic Programming Problem
This section describes the recursive problem households face, using the prop-
erties discussed in Section 2.3. Two value functions are used to represent working
households (Vw during periods t = 1 ∼ 4) and retired households (Vr during periods
t = 5 ∼ 8). An indicator function I is extensively used in the model, which equals
one when the condition in the superscript is satisfied and zero otherwise.
Vw(t, d, m, h, z) = max
c,s,d′,m′,h′
u(c, s) + (1− Iw4) · βE[Vw(t+ 1, d′ + T, m′, h′, z′)]
+ Iw4 · βE[Vr(t+ 1, d′ + T, m′, h′)] (2.3)
subject to:
c+ ps(s− h′) + Ih′ 6=h · (κs · phh+ κp · phh′) + δh · phh′ + Ih
′>s · ω (2.4)
≤ y − [d′ − (1 + r) · d] +m′ − (1 + rm) ·m+ ph(h− h′)−
[
τ yỹ + τhphh′
]
(2.5)
ỹ = y + r · d+ Ih′>s
[
(1− τ ll) · ps(s− h′)
]
(2.6)
m′ ≤ (1− θ)phh′ (2.7)
m′ ≥ 0 and d′ ≥ 0 (2.8)
h′ ≥ s if h′ > 0. (2.9)
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Households from period t = 1 to 4 face the recursive problem above.19 They
enter the economy at t = 1 with zero assets and mortgage debt (d = 0, h = 0
and m = 0). Each period they earn (stochastic) labor income y, choose how much
nondurable goods and housing services to consume, accumulate deposits and/or
purchase housing. Labor income y is determined by the wage and total productivity
of the household, i.e. y = w · ezit+εt . In addition, at the end of each period, they
receive transfers (T ) from government, which are added to deposits of the next
period. Households pay transaction costs whenever they change their house size
(i.e. h′ 6= h) and all homeowners pay maintenance costs. Landlords can deduct part
(τ ll) of their rental income from taxable income ỹ (eq.(2.6)). Mortgage debt cannot
exceed the level implied by the down payment constraint (eq.(2.7)).
Vr(t, d,m, h) = max
c,s,d′,m′,h′
u(c, s) + (1− Ir4) · βE[Vr(t+ 1, d′, m′, h′)] + Ir4 · φ(d′, h′)
(2.10)
subject to:
c+ ps(s− h′) + Ih′ 6=h · (κsphh+ κpphh′) + δh · phh′ + Ih
′>s · ω
≤ b− [d′ − (1 + r) · d] +m′ − (1 + rm)m+ ph(h− h′)−
[
τ yỹr + τhphh′
]
(2.11)
ỹr = b+ r · d− Ih
′>sτ llph(h′ − s) (2.12)
19Iw4 is one when t = 4, Iw is one if households are workers and I ll is one if households are
landlords. An indicator function Iw4 is used to separate the last working period (t = 4) from the
rest since households at t = 4 consider the value function of retirees.
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and eq. (2.7) ∼ (2.9).
The dynamic problem of retired households is similar to the problem of working
households with a few exceptions: first, they receive pension b instead of labor
income. Second, households die at the end of t = 8, and thus in that period they
consider how much to leave as bequests.20
2.5 Stationary Equilibrium
Competitive Stationary Equilibrium Let x be a state vector (z, d,m, h) with
individual state variables, let S be the state space supporting x, and let BS be
the Borel σ-field. A stationary competitive equilibrium consists of value functions
V w and V r, prices {ph, ps, r, w} government policies {τ y, τh, b, T}, policy functions,
allocations, and a stationary distribution over x such that
1. Given prices, government policies, and the distribution of x, c(x), s(x), h′(x),
d′(x) and m′(x) solve the household maximization problems.
2. The representative firm maximizes profit:
r = F1(K, L)− δ (2.13)
w = F2(K, L). (2.14)
20Note that I separate the last period from the rest in eq.(2.7) using an indicator function Ir4,
which is one at t = 8 and zero otherwise. The bequest utility function is given by eq.(2.2).
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4. All markets clear:22
D = M +K, (2.17)
H = Hs, (2.18)
S = Hs, (2.19)
C + IK + IH +G+ Γ = Y. (2.20)
Note that aggregate variables are denoted with capital letters: D, M , H, S
and C represent aggregate deposits, mortgage debt, housing demand, housing service
consumption and consumption respectively. They are aggregates of individual-level
allocations, e.g. D =
∫
S d
′(x) dλ. Γ is aggregate transaction costs, while IK and
IH denote aggregate investment in (nonresidential) capital and housing stock. Note
that I assume housing stock Hs is fixed.23
21G represents government expenditure.
22Refer to Appendix B.1 for a solution algorithm.









ωdλ(x) + ιM ,
where Sell and Buy represent selling households and purchasing households.
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2.6 Calibration
Parameter Value Parameter Value
AR(1) coefficient ρz 0.90 Risk aversion (consumption) γ1 3.0
Innovation of prod. σ2z 0.55 Risk aversion (housing) γ2 1.5
Age Efficiency Unit εt see text Utility Discount for Renter ψ 0.3
Selling cost κs 0.07 Mortgage spread ι 0.70%
Purchasing cost κp 0.025 Rental Depreciation Rate τ ll 0.5
Maintenance Cost δh 0.015 Property tax rate τh 0.0013
Depreciation Rate (K) δ 0.097 Down-payment ratio θ 0.2
Capital Income Share α 0.26
Note: All parameters are calibrated to match annual data moments respectively.
Table 2.4: Externally Calibrated Parameters
In this section, I discuss the calibrated parameters that are used in this paper.
As in Cho [2010], I take the earnings persistence level ρz from De Nardi [2004] and
choose variance σ2z to match the Gini coefficient for the average earnings of working
households (age 20 to 59) from the recent Korean Labor and Income Panel Study
(KLIPS) data from 2010 to 2017 (waves 13 to 20).24 I use Tauchen and Hussey
[1991] to discretize the income process into a four-state Markov chain. I report
the productivity level and transition matrix in Appendix B.2. The age-dependent
average earnings profile εt is calibrated using the average earnings profile from the
same KLIPS data following Cho [2010].25
I assume separate relatve risk aversion parameters for nonhousing consumption
(γ1) and housing services (γ2), and use the values from Cho [2012]. I fix the utility
24The legal retirement age in Korea is 60 years old.
25I calculate the average earnings for each age bin starting from age 20 to age 89 by 10 year
intervals.
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discount rate for rental housing ψ as 0.3 as in Cho [2012] and Mnasri [2015]. I use
the selling and purchasing transaction cost parameters estimated by Gruber and
Martin [2003], which are frequently used in the literature. The maintenance cost
parameter δh is set to 0.015, following Dı́az and Luengo-Prado [2010].
For the mortgage spread, I compare constant maturity rates of Korean govern-
ment bonds and mortgage loans and choose 0.7%.26 The deduction rate for rental
income is a unique deduction for homeowners in Korea, and the actual rate ranges
from 20% to 75% depending on the number and unit size of rental housing. I as-
sume that 50% of rental income is deducted from income taxation in my model.
The property tax rate on housing in Korea is among the lowest in the OECD, and
its effective rate is 0.13%. I use this tax rate as a benchmark property tax rate on
housing. Down payment ratio θ is set at 0.5, reflecting lower average loan-to-value
(LTV) ratios in Korea than in other OECD countries.27 To estimate the capital
depreciation rate and capital income share, I use Korean National Accounts data
from 2000 to 2018. I match data for private nonresidential assets to capital K and
private residential assets for housing stock H.
Seven moments are jointly chosen internally to match a given set of aggregate
targets. First, the nonresidential capital to output ratio (K/Y in the model), com-
26The Korean government bond constant maturity rate is used as a proxy for the interest rate
on deposits, and a constant maturity ”Bogeumjari Loan” rate provided by the Korean Housing
Finance Corporation is used as a proxy for the mortgage loan rate. The spread ranges from 0.60%
to 0.74%, depending on whether the mortgage maturity is 10 years, 20 years or 30 years. All data
are average rates from 2014 to 2019.
27Kim et al. [2018] estimated the LTV ratio using 225,809 fixed-rate mortgage loans issued
between 2004 and 2009. The loan-to-value (LTV) ratio ranges from 30 to 70% and the average
LTV ratio is 57.48%. In comparison, Cho [2010] and Cho [2012] use even higher down payment
ratios of 0.8 and 0.75, respectively.
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Parameter Value Moment Model Data
Discount Factor β 0.951 Capital / Output 2.350 2.350
Bequest Motive φ1 -8.259 Bequest / Wealth 0.50% 0.70%
Bequest Utility Shifter φ2 0.076 90th perc. of Bequest / Income 4.173 4.340
Income Tax Rate τ y 0.393 Gov. spending / Output 15.0% 15.0%
Consumption Share η 0.780 Housing / Consumption 0.190 0.290
Fixed Cost (Landlords) ω 0.005 Landlord / Homeowner 0.042 0.044
House Supply Hs 0.800 Homeownership Rate 60.9% 60.0%
Table 2.5: Internally Calibrated Parameters
puted using the National Accounts data of Korea from 2000 to 2018, is matched
using the discount factor parameter β. The total level of bequests in the economy
is matched by calibrating the two bequest utility parameters φ1 and φ2 to the av-
erage bequest to wealth ratio and the 90th percentile of the bequest distribution
normalized by income. Cho [2010] estimates the bequest to wealth ratio of Korea
as 0.7%, which is lower than the ratio in the United States (0.88%, Gale and Scholz
1994). As reliable data for the distribution of bequests in Korea is not available, I
borrow the 90th percentile of the bequest distribution normalized by income in the
U.S. from [De Nardi and Yang, 2016]. Income tax rate τ y is calibrated to match the
government expenditure to output ratio, while the consumption share η is calibrated
to match the ratio of personal expenditure on housing services to nonhousing con-
sumption goods, all measured using the National Accounts data of Korea. According
to the report by the Bank of Korea on the 2018 Survey of Household Finances and
Living Conditions, the homeownership rate is 60% and the ratio of landlords to
homeowners is 0.14. I use these values to discipline the fixed cost ω and the housing
stock Hs.28
28Please refer to http://kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/surveyOutline/6/2/index.static for more details
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2.7 Benchmark Results
In this section, I present results for the benchmark model simulation for the
Korean economy. Table 2.6 compares non-targeted aggregate statistics between the
model economy and the data.29 While the model economy matches the ratio of
financial assets to output well, households in the model economy hold more housing
and less mortgage debt compared to the data.
Data Model
Homeowners in Debt (%) 26.4 17.6
Financial Asset to Output ratio (D/Y ) 2.49 2.30
Housing Stock to Output ratio (H/Y ) 0.86 1.38
Table 2.6: Aggregate Statistics for Benchmark Model
Figure 2.3 displays the model profile of aggregate deposits and housing stock
by household age. One can notice that both assets display a standard hump-shaped
pattern over the lifecycle, which peaks at the last working period (t = 4). In
addition, households decumulate housing stock more slowly than deposits over the
lifecycle. These two features are consistent with the data patterns reported in Cho
[2010].
Next, I compare the wealth distribution estimated from the Survey of House-
hold Finances and Living Conditions 2010 - 2018 with the model simulated wealth
distribution. From Table 2.7, one can notice that my model exhibits a wealth dis-
tribution similar to the distribution of wealth observed in Korea in the early 2010s,
on the Survey of Household Finances and Living Conditions.
29Statistics for households in debt are from the Housing Finance Statistics Report issued by the
Korea Housing Corporation, and the other statistics are computed from the National Accounts
data of Korea from 2000 to 2018.
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(a) Lifecycle Holdings of Deposit (b) Lifecycle Holdings of Housing
Figure 2.3: Lifecycle Profile of Deposit and Housing Stock
particularly as measured by the Wealth Gini index (0.63 vs. 0.59∼0.63), although
the model fails to reproduce the high share of total wealth held by the top 10 per-
centile in Korea. Note also that both the wealth Gini and the share of wealth held
by the top 10 % wealthy households have fallen in recent years in Korea, suggesting
declining wealth inequality, in contrast to the rising wealth inequality observed in
many OECD countries.
Wave Percentile Gini
60 40 30 20 10
Data
2010 95.4 85.1 76.8 65.1 47.2 0.628
2011 95.5 84.8 76.0 63.9 46.1 0.619
2012 94.8 84.2 75.6 63.8 46.2 0.616
2013 94.6 83.5 74.6 62.4 44.7 0.605
2014 94.1 82.7 73.8 61.5 43.7 0.596
2015 94.0 82.3 73.2 60.8 42.9 0.590
2016 94.1 82.1 72.8 60.2 42.1 0.585
2017 94.1 82.1 72.7 60.0 41.8 0.584
2018 94.2 82.3 73.1 60.5 42.3 0.588
Model
97.38 87.46 77.49 62.61 40.34 0.6259
Source: Survey of Household Finances and Living Conditions (2010∼2018)
Table 2.7: Total Wealth held by Households in the Top Percentile (%)
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2.8 Policy Experiments
In the benchmark economy, the government applies a uniform property tax rate
on all housing. In this section, I introduce a second tax rate for homeowners who
own a large stock of housing, which reflects the observed heavy taxation on multiple
home owners in Korea as discussed in Section 2.2. I assume that the amount of
housing held by homeowners is a proxy for the number of housing units owned,
and thus I use the term ”small housing” when households own a small number of
housing units and ”large housing” when households own a large number of housing
units. Accordingly, I set a lower property tax rate for ”small housing” and a higher
property tax rate for ”large housing”. I assume that the lowest three grid points
are considered as small homes and the rest as large homes (h′). First, I investigate
a property tax scheme which separates small home owners and large home owners.
Second, as an extension of the first experiment, I compare the equilibria in which
1) the uniform property tax rate is doubled, 2) only the property tax rate for large
housing is doubled, 3) only the property tax rate for large housing is tripled.
Note that throughout the experiments, I assume that tax revenue that exceeds
the government consumption and pension spending is treated as excess tax revenue
and redistributed to all the households.30 The idea is to control unintended effects
on the consumption of households and have a fair welfare comparison, since without
this redistribution, households would be worse off after all the tax revisions that
weakly increase tax rates for everyone.31
30Bequests are still fully taxed and redistributed to workers.
31Note that having an additional lumpsum transfer does not change the results much, compared
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2.8.1 Experiment 1: Dual Tax Rates
The new tax scheme consists of a lower tax rate τhs for small housing and a
higher tax rate τhl for large housing. Two alternative sets of tax rates (τhs , τhl ) are
considered: {(Exp 1-1), (Exp 1-2)} = {(0.1%, 0.17%), (0.025%, 0.28%)}.32 The tax
rates are chosen as follows: first, I assume that the Korean government changes its
tax regime without changing total tax revenue in the initial steady state. Given
that limitation, I set the lower tax rate to be smaller than the current rate (from
0.13% to 0.1% or 0.025%), and then calculate the higher tax rate that yields the
same total tax revenue based on the benchmark model’s housing distribution.33
Price Asset
House Price Rent Interest Rate ph
ps
Deposit Housing D/H
Benchmark 9.069 0.8526 3.9056% 10.64 0.119 0.07255 1.640
Exp 1-1 9.073 0.8533 3.9055% 10.63 0.120 0.07259 1.654
Exp 1-2 9.078 0.8546 3.9046% 10.62 0.120 0.07264 1.653
Note: Benchmark: τh = 0.13%, Exp 1-1: (τhs , τhl ) = (0.1%, 0.17%), Exp 1-2: (τhs , τhl ) =
(0.025%, 0.28%)
Table 2.8: Aggregate Effects of the Property Tax Change
As the tax scheme is altered, current homeowners who hold large housing
now face a higher property tax rate, while the rest of the households enjoy a lower
property tax rate. The asymmetry in the property tax rate attracts households
to demand less housing, and as a result, households downsize their house sizes,
and fewer people are landlords. Figure 2.4 shows the shares of the population
with the experiments without the lumpsum transfer (the difference is very small).
32I use ”Exp” as an abbreviation of a policy experiment hereafter.
33In practice, government could consider other factors such as the housing price elasticity. In
addition, as the new tax schemes are in effect, tax revenue can be different in the new equilibrium
due to changes in housing choices.
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owning small and large housing in each experiment, and one can notice that as the
asymmetry in property tax rate increases (from the benchmark to Exp 1-2), the
share of households who hold small housing increases from 45.84% to 47.12%.
Note: Figures represent population shares and the numbers add up to homeownership
rate.
Figure 2.4: Change in Housing Distribution (Exp-1)
At the same time, as lower tax rates induce marginal renters with less wealth
to become homeowners, the homeownership rate rises, as does total demand for
owned housing. As a result of excess demand in both markets, the housing price
and rent increase. The rent increase reveals that the decreased number of landlords
dominates the decreased number of renters. The lower interest rate is a reflection
of resource reallocation from housing to deposits (refer to ”D/H” in Table 2.8).
Homeowner (A) Landlord (B) Renter B / A
Benchmark 60.934 2.630 39.066 0.04317
Exp 1-1 60.935 2.616 39.065 0.04293
Exp 1-2 60.938 2.615 39.062 0.04292
Note: Exp 1-1: (τhs , τhl ) = (0.1%, 0.17%), Exp 1-2: (τhs , τhl ) = (0.025%, 0.28%)
Table 2.9: Change in Housing Tenure (%)
At the new steady-state equilibrium in both sub-experiments (”Exp 1-1” and
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”Exp 1-2”), the level of wealth inequality falls, as measured by the Gini index shown
in Table 2.10. One can also note from Table 2.10 that the top 10 and 20 percentile
households now hold less wealth, which suggests that punitive taxation on large
housing transfers wealth from the wealthy to the poor.34
Percentile Gini
60 40 30 20 10
Benchmark 0.9738 0.8747 0.7748 0.6262 0.4034 0.6259
Exp 1-1 0.9738 0.8745 0.7748 0.6257 0.4027 0.6258
Exp 1-2 0.9738 0.8744 0.7747 0.6255 0.4025 0.6256
Note: (τhs , τhl ) Exp 1-1: (0.1%,0.17%), Exp 1-2: (0.025%,0.28%)
Numbers in the percentile columns show the percentage of total wealth held by
households in the top percentiles.
Table 2.10: Change in the Wealth Distribution
In addition to the distributional changes, I report the changes in social welfare
induced by each tax experiment, using the expected utility of new born agents as the
social welfare function. In Table 2.11, social welfare improves in both tax schemes,
and increases more when the higher tax rate is increased (from +0.09% to +0.10%).
Thus, one can conclude that the new tax schemes improve social welfare.
Overall, changes in the property tax scheme that penalize large home own-
ers make the wealth distribution more equal. Table 2.12 shows changes in output
and consumption in both experiments. Even though output and consumption of
the economy increase, consumption of households in the top 25% of the wealth dis-
34I run an alternative, but similar tax scheme that sets a low property tax rate on owner-occupiers
and a high property tax rate on landlords. The idea is that as landlords are multiple home owners
by definition, distinguishing landlords from owner-occupiers in property taxation would fit the
intended policy experiment. However, the mass of landlords in the benchmark model is in the
largest housing grid point and therefore the analysis is limited. In addition, this alternative tax
scheme does not perfectly reflect the actual policy in Korea, e.g. owner-occupiers can also have
multiple homes. The results of this alternative experiment are qualitatively similar to the current
experiment.
72
Benchmark Exp 1-1 Exp 1-2
1 + 0.09% + 0.10%
Note: This table shows the percentage change in social welfare relative to the
benchmark economy under each alternative tax schemes.
Table 2.11: Change in Social Welfare
tribution falls in all experiments. This suggests that the alternative tax schemes
redistribute wealth from the wealthy households to the poor households, which re-
duces the welfare of the wealthy households (as measured by their consumption
level). If I further include heterogeneous asset returns or entrepreneurial productiv-
ity of households in the model, the welfare of the economy could be further reduced
under the alternative tax schemes, as the wealthy would invest less. In this sense, I
argue that one should be careful to interpret these results as justifying the Korean
tax scheme.35
Output Consumption
Total Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Benchmark 0.520952 0.35130 0.25545 0.27088 0.34748 0.53138
Exp 1-1 0.520954 0.35151 0.25554 0.27037 0.34894 0.53119
Exp 1-2 0.520975 0.35154 0.25682 0.26908 0.34899 0.53125
Note: Q1∼Q4 denote households in corresponding wealth quartile bins: e.g. Q1
represents the bottom 25% households in wealth.
Table 2.12: Change in Aggregate Output and Consumption
35One can argue that the Korean property tax scheme is improving the wealth distribution.
However, one cannot argue that it is an ”efficient” policy tool to achieve an equal wealth distribution
in Korea or a welfare improving tax policy.
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2.8.2 Experiment 2: Increased Tax Rates, Single vs. Dual
A series of property tax revisions have recently been adopted by the Korean
government that increase tax rates on all housing, but more drastically on multiple
home owners’ properties. In line with the announced plan, I consider introducing
the following set of tax rates to the model economy: (Exp 2-1), (Exp 2-2), (Exp 2-
3) = {(0.26%), (0.13%, 0.26%), (0.13%, 0.39%)}. In short, the first tax experiment
doubles the current property tax rate, the second experiment doubles the property
tax rate only on large size housing and the third experiment triples the property
tax rate only on large size housing.
Price Asset
House Price Rent Interest Rate ph/ps Deposit Housing D/H
Benchmark 9.069 0.8526 3.9056% 10.64 0.1190 0.0726 1.6402
Exp 2-1 9.054 0.8531 3.9031% 10.61 0.1195 0.0724 1.6501
Exp 2-2 9.060 0.8544 3.9086% 10.60 0.1200 0.0725 1.6553
Exp 2-3 9.062 0.8559 3.9042% 10.59 0.1200 0.0725 1.6550
Note: (τhs , τhl ): Exp 2-1: 0.26 (single rate), Exp 2-2: (0.13%,0.26%), Exp 2-3: (0.13%,0.39%)
Table 2.13: Aggegate Effects of the Property Tax Change
As the tax rate is doubled (Exp 2-1), owning a house now requires more tax
payment, and consequently housing demand and the housing price fall (the home-
ownership rate falls from ”Benchmark” to ”Exp 2-1” in Table 2.14). The lower
housing price attracts homeowners to increase housing size, leading to more land-
lords in the new equilibrium. (Figure 2.5). On the other hand, if the government
doubles the property tax rate only for large housing (Exp 2-2), the total homeown-
ership rate increases (compare ”Exp 2-2” with ”Benchmark”), while the number
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Figure 2.5: Change in Housing Distribution (Exp-2)
of landlords falls relative to the benchmark. This is because asymmetric tax rates
attract more households to own small housing (1.8%p increase in small housing).
As the overall housing demand is concentrated on small housing, the housing price
falls by less than in ”Exp 2-1”, and the fall in rental supply causes rents to increase
(Table 2.13). Finally, if the government further increases the property tax rate on
large size housing (Exp 2-3), the same qualitative changes to asset allocation, price
variables and housing tenure occur as in ”Exp 2-2”.
Homeowner (A) Landlord (B) Renter B / A
Benchmark 60.9345 2.630 39.066 0.0432
Exp 2-1 60.9343 2.634 39.066 0.0432
Exp 2-2 60.9371 2.619 39.063 0.0430
Exp 2-3 60.9373 2.619 39.063 0.0430
Note: (τhs , τhl ): Exp 2-1: 0.26, Exp 2-2: (0.13%,0.26%), Exp 2-3: (0.13%,0.39%)
Table 2.14: Change in Housing Tenure (%)
In terms of the wealth distribution, the level of inequality increases by a small
amount in ”Exp 2-1”, due to a general increase in property tax rate (refer to Table
2.15).36 However, introducing a second property tax rate helps to decrease wealth
36Since the property tax is proportional, not progressive, the overall increase in the tax rate
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inequality, as the wealth Gini falls if we transit from ”Exp 2-1” to ”Exp 2-2” and
”Exp 2-3”.37
Percentile Gini
60 40 30 20 10
Benchmark 0.9738 0.8747 0.7748 0.6262 0.4034 0.62592
Exp 2-1 0.9739 0.8748 0.7749 0.6263 0.4035 0.62603
Exp 2-2 0.9739 0.8745 0.7750 0.6259 0.4029 0.62591
Exp 2-3 0.9739 0.8745 0.7749 0.6258 0.4027 0.62579
Note: (τhs , τhl ): Exp 2-1: 0.26 (single rate), Exp 2-2: (0.13%,0.26%), Exp 2-3:
(0.13%,0.39%). Numbers in percentile column mean the percentage of total wealth
held by households in the top percentiles.
Table 2.15: Change in the Wealth Distribution
Note that this decrease in wealth inequality comes with a fall in consumption
of wealthy households in the top 25%, who hold large housing as in Subsection 2.8.1.
Overall social welfare increases in all experiments, and increases the most in ”Exp
2-3” in Table 2.17.
Output Consumption
Total Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Benchmark 0.52095 0.35130 0.25545 0.27088 0.34748 0.53138
Exp 2-1 0.52101 0.35131 0.25553 0.27110 0.34732 0.53128
Exp 2-2 0.52088 0.35153 0.25555 0.27047 0.34885 0.53124
Exp 2-3 0.52098 0.35153 0.25562 0.27049 0.34883 0.53119
Note: Q1∼Q4 denote households in corresponding wealth quartile bins: e.g. Q1
represents the bottom 25% households in wealth.
Table 2.16: Change in Aggregate Output and Consumption
Lastly, I investigate alternative tax schemes in which the income tax rates are
adjusted (lowered) to compensate for the increased property tax rates in the second
increases wealth inequality in the model.
37Comparing ”Exp 2-2” and ”Exp 2-3” is the clearest way to make this argument, since they
both have the same tax rate for small housing unlike the comparison of ”Exp 2-1” to ”Exp 2-2”.
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Benchmark Exp 2-1 Exp 2-2 Exp 2-3
1 +0.11% +0.10% +0.14%
Note: This table shows the percentage change in social welfare relative to the
benchmark economy under each alternative tax schemes.
Table 2.17: Change in social Welfare
set of experiments. Results are qualitatively the same, except that the lowered
income tax rate further decreases wealth inequality (I report the relevant tables in
Appendix B.3).
2.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the effects on the wealth distribution of a recent Korean
property tax scheme that penalizes multiple home owners with higher tax rates,
using a dynamic lifecycle model. My model shows that the tax scheme decreases
wealth inequality, yet the magnitude of the impact is small. Although the policy
improves the wealth inequality of Korea, I hesitate to call it an efficient policy tool,
in consideration of potential opportunity costs and welfare losses.
Since this paper is the first to analyze the distributional effects of the Korean
housing property tax system theoretically, more features can be added to the model
in subsequent work. As this paper is part of the literature that studies the wealth
distribution, having a model that can generate a more rich and realistic wealth
distribution is crucial. In that sense, stochastic asset returns, both on deposits and
housing stock, can be considered. Lastly, the capital gains tax that is incurred when
selling housing in Korea also discriminates against multiple home owners. Therefore,
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analyzing the distributional effects of the capital gains tax can be worthwhile as well.
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Appendices
A.1 Goods Market Clearing
In this Section, I show that the steady state equilibrium condition for the
goods market can be derived from individual agents’ optimal decisions and other
markets’ equilibrium conditions. In a sense, I prove that Walras’ law holds in the
model. Per-capita, individual-level variables are denoted as xt ≡ Xt, where Xt ∈
{Ct, St, Dt, Kt,Mt, Ht, Gt, Yt} denote aggregate variables.38
There is some different notation used in this Section. Every variable with sub-
script wl stands for working landlords, wo for working homeowners, wr for working
renters, rl for retired landlords, ro for retired homeowners, rr for retired renters.
Furthermore, aggregate variables are written in corresponding capital letters. One
needs to recall that the timing convention for residential assets is different in the in-
dividual agent’s decision as h′ is a decision at the beginning of the period. However,
I denote the aggregate variable H using the same timing convention as the other
state variables to avoid confusion: i.e., H is total (aggregate) residentials asset for
this period.
Now, consider a working landlord making her choices of consumption c and
s, assets d′ and h′, and mortgage debt m′. One can easily show how her budget
38Note that the model economy has no growth.
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constraint can be rearranged at the steady-state equilibrium as follows:
cwl = (1− τ y)
[
wlwl + rdwl + ρ(h′wl − swl)− τhqh′wl − δhq(h′wl − swl)
]
− (1− τ yτm)rmmwl − ω + τ yτ llq(h′wl − swl)− δhqswl − [Isκsqhwl + Ipκpqh′wl]
− [(d′wl − dwl) + q(h′wl − hwl)− (m′wl −mwl)]
The first three terms on the first line are labor earnings, interest from financial
assets, and rental income from houses net of income taxes respectively. The last two
terms on the first line of the equation are property tax, and maintenance costs on
rental houses. The second line shows mortgage loan payment net of deductions, the
fixed transaction cost of landlords, deductions for depreciation of tenant-occupied
houses, maintenance costs for her own house, and individual transaction costs. The
last line of the equation shows the changes in the levels of financial assets, residential
assets, and mortgage debt. I changed the notation for transaction costs to Ix to
save notation, where x ∈ {s, p} states the situation of selling and purchasing housing
respectively.
A working homeowner’s budget constraint at the steady-state is
cwo = (1− τ y)
[
wlwo + rdwo − τhqh′wo + bwo
]
− (1− τ yτ)rmmwo − δhqswo
− [Isκsqhwo + Ipκpqh′wo]− [(d′wo − dwo) + q(h′wo − hwo)− (m′wo −mwo)] .
Notice that incomes and deductions for landlords disappear from this equation,
and further that ρ(swo − h′wo) is removed as swo = h′wo.
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A working tenant-occupier or renter’s budget constraint at the steady state is:
cwr = (1− τ y) [wlwr + rdwr + bwr]− ρswr − [(d′wr − dwr)− qhwr +mwr] .
Similarly, budget constraints for retirees with different tenure choice can be
summarized as the following three equations at the steady state:
crl = (1− τ y)
[
tr + rdrl + ρ(h′rl − srl)− τhqh′rl − δhq(h′rl − srl)
]
− (1− τ yτm)rmmrl − ω + τ yτ llq(h′rl − srl)− δhqsrl − [Isκsqhrl + Ipκpqh′rl]
− [(d′rl − drl) + q(h′rl − hrl)− (m′rl −mrl)] ,
cro = (1− τ y)
[
tr + rdro − τhqh′ro
]
− (1− τ yτm)rmmro − δhqsro
− [Isκsqhrl + Ipκpqh′rl]− [(d′ro − dro) + q(h′ro − hro)− (m′ro −mro)] , and
crr = (1− τ y) [tr + rdrr]− ρsrr − [(d′rr − drr)− qhrr +mrr)] .
Note that social security income tr replaces labor income in the retiree’s budget
constraint. Now, aggregating the budget constraints of all agents in the economy
gives the following equation:
C = wLW + PENS
− τ y(wLW + rK + PENS + ρ(swr + srr)− τhqH − τmrM − τ llq(h′wl + h′rl − swl − srl)
− τhqH − δhq(h′wl + h′rl − swl − srl)− δhq(swl + swo + srl + sro)










(lwl(x) + lwo(x) + lwr(x)) dλ(x)
L = LW + LR
















The first line of the first equation above is total income of all agents, coming
from the labor income wLW and pensions PENS. Note that at the steady state
equilibrium, the sum of landlords’ rental incomes from houses ρ(h′wl+h′rl−swl−srl)
cancels out the sum of renters’ rental payments ρ(swr + srr).
The second line shows the income tax on the incomes stated in the first line,
plus landlords’ rental incomes from rental units, minus respective deductions for
landlords and homeowners. The third line shows property taxes on total housing
stocks and maintenance costs incurred to landlords and homeowners. The fourth
line shows interest from financial assets D and interest payments on mortgage debt
M , and total transaction costs TRANS.
As the financial intermediary’s budget is balanced, rD− rmM in the fifth line
39L is the number of total population which consists of labor force LW and retiree LR. Note
that I leave population growth rate variable n in the equation.
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turns into rK − ιM . I combine this with labor income and get wLW + rK − ιM .
Since the final goods firm in the competitive market has zero profit, this term can
now be simplified to F (K,L)− δK − ιM .
C = F (K,L) + PENS − δK − ιM
− τ y
[
F (K,L)− δK + PENS + ρSR − τhqH − τmrM − τ llq(HLL − SLL)− δhq(HLL − SLL)
]
− τhqH − δhq(HLL +HO)− TRANS.
The equation can be further simplified using aggregate residential asset and housing
service consumption variables for landlords (LL), homeowners (O), and renters (R):
S = SLL + SO + SR =
∫
S
(swl(x) + srl(x)) dλ(x) +
∫
S




(swr(x) + srr(x)) dλ(x)
H = HLL +HO =
∫
S
(hwl(x) + hrl(x)) dλ(x) +
∫
S
(hwo(x) + hro(x)) dλ(x)
Finally, the aggregate equilibrium condition for the goods market is the following:
C + IK + IH +G+ Γ = Y,
where IK denotes gross nonresidential investment, IH denotes residential investment
needed to keep housing stocks constant, G denotes government expenditure, and Γ
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denotes transaction costs defined as below. 40
IK = δK
IH = δhqH
G = T − PENS
Γ = TRANS + ιM,
in which total tax revenue T and total deductions DED are defined as the following:




DED = τ y
(
τhqH + τmrM + τ llq(HLL − SLL) + δhq(HLL − SLL)
)
.
Note that bequests merge with financial assets in the second period and thus disap-
pear from the final equation. To summarize, the goods market equilibrium condition
is redundant due to Walras’ law, which holds in this model.
A.2 Parameter in the Bequest Utility
In this Section, I refer to the online Appendix 1.6 of De Nardi and Yang [2016]
and interpret the bequest utility function which follows their functional form. Two
parameters φ1 and φ2 explicitly governs the agent’s decision over the bequest to
pass to the next generation at death. To better understand their role in bequest
giving, consider an agent who starts the period with net worth x and dies for sure
40Residential investment is maintenance costs since housing supply is fixed in this model.
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next period. In the model, x ≡ qh + d − m. The agent faces budget constraint
bn = x− c−ρs, where bn denotes the bequest, c nondurable consumption, s housing
services, and ρ the rental price. The bequest level one considers to derive utility
is the gross bequest net of estate tax (net bequest): bn = x′ if x′ < xb and bn =
(1− τb)(x′ − xb) + xb if x′ ≥ xb, where x′ is net worth left after consuming c at the
end of the period. I confine the following analysis to the interior solution.
The agent solves the following maximization problem:
max c
1−γ
1− γ + φ1
[




bn = x− c if x′ < xb
bn = (1− τb)(x− c− xb) + xb if x′ ≥ xb
where c is a vector of consumption baskets which consist of nondurable con-
sumption and housing services. If x′ < xb, the first-order condition of the problem









If x′ ≥ xb, we have:
bn =
(1− τb)(x− xb − φ2f2) + xb









Now, one can interpret the equations above as follows: the optimal bn in the
equation is applicable only when x is large enough, otherwise the agent will not
leave any bequest. Consequently, φ2 governs the threshold wealth level such that
the larger the level of φ2 , the larger bequest bn becomes. The marginal utility from








bn = 1−τb1+f1 if x
′ ≥ xb
.
Therefore, φ1 can attract the agent to bequeath more by affecting the marginal
utility from leaving bequests.
A.3 Computation Specification
A.3.1 Estimation of Capital Income Share
Recently, Gomme and Rupert [2007] have challenged the seminal work of Coo-
ley and Prescott [1995] in the estimation of the capital income share. The two papers
differ in their definition of capital stock: Gomme and Rupert [2007] implement a
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narrow measure of capital by excluding government capital and do not impute cap-
ital income to government, while Cooley and Prescott [1995] use a broad measure
of capital including government capital and household capital, and impute capital
income to government and household capital. I choose the narrow measure of cap-
ital by excluding government capital, but treat consumption durables as part of
nonresidential capital unlike Gomme and Rupert [2007].41 I separate nonresidential
capital K and residential capital H to match the framework of my paper.
I define output Y as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) net of service flows from
housing YH and labor income to government YLG. In this way, I can consider the ex-
istence of residential housing explicitly and can define Y as the sum of labor income
and nonresidential capital income in the private sector.42 Output Y is comprised
of three parts: unambiguous private capital income YK , unambiguous private labor
income YL, and ambiguous private income YA. Following the assumption of com-
petitive factor markets, I assign the share of ambiguous private income to capital.
Therefore, total private capital income is YK + αYA. Consequently, I can estimate






41Gomme and Rupert [2007] treat consumption durables as household capital.
42Ideally, it should be the case that GDP = YLH + YKH + YKP + YLP + YKG + YLG, where
subscript L denotes labor income, K capital income, H house sector, P private sector where in the
paper I omitted intentionally, G government sector. However, NIPA data do not have measures
for capital income to government and therefore removing only labor income to government can
carve out government sector from output of interest. In fact, this poor measurement of NIPA data
is the main reason behind two different imputation methods introduced here.
43Please note that Y = YK + YL + YA.
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In this way, I do not need to impute income flows from durables or government
capital, unlike Cooley and Prescott [1995].
A.3.2 Estimation of Aggregate Variables
I define aggregate variables to be measured in NIPA and FAT data to be in
line with the model structure. In terms of expenditure, output Y can be spent
on nondurable consumption C, investment in nonresidential capital IK , investment
in residential capital IH , and government spending G. The variable C is the sum
of private consumption expenditures on nondurables and services excluding housing
expenditures and government consumption expenditures. The variable IK is the sum
of private nonresidential fixed investment plus the change in private inventories,
and IH is residential fixed investment plus personal consumption expenditure on
durables. The stock variable K includes private fixed nonresidential assets, private
inventories, and the stock of consumer durables as discussed above, and H is private
fixed residential assets and private inventories. Lastly, government spending G is
government consumption expenditures as measured in the NIPA.
I compute the nonresidential capital stock depreciation rate following Gomme
and Rupert [2007]. FAT data provides figures for both the capital stock and depreci-
ation. The depreciation rate for capital x in year t is computed as depreciation of x




The downside of this method is that it slightly overestimates the depreciation rate
since BEA treats investment over year t as occurring half way through the year.44
44In short, the depreciation rate for year t includes only 6 months of depreciation on investments
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Variable Estimation in NIPA and FAT
Y Nominal private market output:
Gross Domestic Product - Gross Housing Product - Government Com-
pensation of Employees
YK Nominal private unambiguous capital income:
(Rental Income + Net Interest Income + Corporate Profits) + (Gross
National Product - Net National Product) - (Housing Rental Income +
Housing Net
Interest Income + Housing Corporate Profits) - (Housing Gross Value
Added - Net Housing Value added)
YL Nominal private unambiguous labor income:
Compensation of Employees- Housing Compensation of Employees
YA Nominal private ambiguous income:
(Proprietors’ Income - Housing Proprietors’ Income)
IK Nominal nonresidential investment:
Fixed Investment + Change in Private Inventories + Personal Con-
sumption Expenditures on Durables
IH Nominal residential investment:
Residential Fixed Investment
C Nominal nondurable consumption:
Private consumption expenditures on nondurables and Services - Hous-
ing
expenditures
K Nominal nonresidential capital:
Private fixed nonresidential assets + Private Inventories + Consumer
Durable Goods
H Nominal residential capital:
Private fixed residential assets + Private inventories
G Nonminal government expenditure :
Government consumption expenditures
Table A.1: Data Description
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A.4 Analytic Relationship of Market Prices
In this section, I analytically describe the relationship between market prices,
i.e. housing price, rent price, and interest rate. Note that I remove time subscript
t from prices since we study the steady-state equilibrium. The Recursive problem
of homeowners is simplified to the following sequential problem with no transaction





s.t. ct + ρ(st − ht+1) + q(ht+1 − ht) + dt+1 −mt+1 +MCt
+ τ y(INCt + rdt − τmrmmt − τhqht+1 −Dedt)
+ τhqht+1 ≤ INCt + (1 + r)dt − (1 + rm)mt
mt+1 ≤ (1− θ)qht+1 ∀t.
I only consider an interior solution here and denote λt and γt as the shadow
prices of the budget constraint and down payment regulation, MCt as maintenance
costs, INCt as labor income and pension income, and Dedt as deductions for land-
lords. Then the first order conditions are the following:
made in year t in BEA data.
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ct :uc(t) = λt




ht+1 :λt(ρ− q +
∂MCt
∂ht+1
+ τ y ∂Dedt
∂ht+1
− τh(1− τ y)q + γt(1− θ)q = −βλt+1q
dt+1 :λt = βλt+1(1 + r − τ yrt+1)
mt+1 :λt − γt = βλt+1((1 + rm)τ y − τmrm)









ρ− q + ∂MCt
∂ht+1
+ τ y ∂Dedt
∂ht+1
q
+ τh(1− τ y)− γt(1− θ)
βuc(t+ 1)
uc(t)
= 11 + r − τ yr
uc(t)(1−
(1 + rm)τ y − τmrm
1 + r − τ yr ) = γt











+ qτh(1− τ y)− qγt(1− θ)
ρ+ ∂MCt
∂ht+1




1− 11 + r − τ yr + τ
h(1− τ y)− (1− θ)uc(t)(1−
(1 + rm)τ y − τmrm




(1− τ y)r − (1− θ)uc(t)(1 + r − (1 + r + rm)τ y − τmrm)
1 + (1− τ y)r
]
(21)
+ qτh(1− τ y)− ∂MCt
∂ht+1
− τ y ∂Dedt
∂ht+1
When we replace ∂MCt
∂ht+1
≡ δhq and ∂Dedt∂ht+1 ≡ ρ− τ
llq − δhq (Note: δh is common
depreciation rate for houses), we find:
ρ
q
= 11 + τ y × {
(1− τ y)r − (1− θ)uc(t)(1 + r − (1 + r + rm)τ y − τmrm)
1 + (1− τ y)r + τ
h(1− τ y)
− δh + τ y(τ ll + δh)}
Since the term inside the bracket is positive, one can see that the rent-to-price
ratio will decrease (equivalently, the price-to-rent ratio increases) with a falling down
payment ratio, if the interest rate does not change. This is consistent with the lit-
erature that reports increasing house price to rent ratios with financial deregulation
under the partial equilibrium framework. However, since this paper considers a gen-
eral equilibrium analysis, the direction of the change of the price-to-rent ratio can
be different.
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A.5 Labor Income Process
I adjust the transition matrices of De Nardi and Yang [2016] to fit into my
model periods. I use their transition matrices for both earnings and productiv-
ity transfer between generations. Specifically, one model period in my model is
20 years, while their model uses 5 years. Therefore I assume these matrices hold
during each model period, and multiply the matrices, and reconstruct the initial
probability masses to be consistent with my model. The support for the productiv-
ity level distribution follows Castañeda et al. [2003] as in De Nardi and Yang [2016]:
The Transition Matrix for earnings process is

0.5965 0.3158 0.0874 0.00030
0.3960 0.3860 0.2175 0.00049
0.2006 0.3961 0.4027 0.00057
0.2717 0.1360 0.1640 0.42837

Transition Matrix for intergenerational productivity transfer is

0.8272 0.1704 0.0024 0.0000000000
0.5748 0.4056 0.0196 0.0000000000
0.2890 0.6173 0.0937 0.0000000005
0.0001 0.0387 0.9599 0.0012647506

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and the initial distribution of earnings over the four productivity levels
[




1. Make a ith guess of the government transfer Ti and a jth guess of the market
clearing price vector: housing price qj, rent price ρj, and interest rate rj.
2. Search for the price values such that excess demand in each market is close to
zero. I use three nested loops to find equilibrium price levels for the housing
stock, housing services and the financial asset.
(a) In each iteration, find the optimal policy functions that solve the corre-
sponding Bellman equations by backwards induction starting from the
last period.
(b) With the policy functions from Step 2-(a), find a stationary distribution
over the state space.
3. With the policy functions and invariant distributions from Step 2, check if all
markets clear. If not satisfied, update the guess for the price vector and repeat
the j + 1th iteration process. If satisfied, check if total government transfer
is equal to aggregate bequests B. If all conditions are satisfied, a stationary
equilibrium is found. If the ith guess of the government transfer Ti does not
balance the government budget, update the guess of government transfers and
repeat the i+ 1th iteration process.45
45The government budget constraint is balanced with flexible government consumption expen-
diture and the goods market clears by Walras’ law.
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B.2 Income Process
In this section, I report relevant figures for the estimated income process. I use




0.4701829 0.7867454 1.2710593 2.1268318
}
Transition matrix
0.7329819 0.2556624 0.0113154 0.0000403
0.1744868 0.5963896 0.221401 0.0077226
0.0077226 0.221401 0.5963896 0.1744868
0.0000403 0.0113154 0.2556624 0.7329819

The age efficiency unit profile is estimated using the Korean Labor and Income
Panel Study (KLIPS) data from 2010 to 2017.
Age efficiency units:
{
1 1.6827577 1.9162517 1.8844634
}
The estimated income process targets the Gini index of Korea (0.35, OECD
2017).
Data∗ Model
Gini Index 0.35 0.33
∗ Source: OECD Social and Welfare Statis-
tics: Income distribution
Table B.1: Income Gini Index
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B.3 Addendum to the Experiment 2
In this section, I show model outcomes from additional experiments as an
extension of Experiment 2 in Section 2.8.2: i.e. the government lowers income
tax rates to compensate for the increased property tax rates as in Experiment 2.
Specifically, table B.2 summarizes the tax schemes. Qualitatively, the results are
the same as in Experiment 2, except that wealth inequality decreases further due to
decreased tax burdens.
Property Tax Rates (%) Income Tax Rate (%)
Benchmark 0.13 39.305
Exp 2-1 0.26 39.290
Exp 2-2 (0.13, 0.26) 39.299
Exp 2-3 (0.13, 0.39) 39.293
Table B.2: Alternative Tax Schemes (Experiment 3)
Homeowner (A) Landlord (B) Renter B / A
Benchmark 60.9345 2.6302 39.0655 0.04317
Exp 3-1 60.9351 2.6164 39.0649 0.04294
Exp 3-2 60.9371 2.6188 39.0629 0.04298
Exp 3-3 60.9374 2.6180 39.0626 0.04296
Table B.3: Change in Housing Tenure (%)
Percentile Gini
60 40 30 20 10
Benchmark 0.9738 0.8747 0.7748 0.6262 0.4034 0.62592
Exp 3-1 0.9739 0.8747 0.7752 0.6259 0.4029 0.62600
Exp 3-2 0.9739 0.8745 0.7750 0.6259 0.4029 0.62591
Exp 3-3 0.9739 0.8745 0.7748 0.6256 0.4025 0.62572
Table B.4: Change in the Wealth Distribution
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Figure B.1: Change in Housing Distribution (Extension to Experiment 2)
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